To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation by Schwarcz, Steven L.
In-House Lawyering.doc 
                  Draft 10/26/06 
 
To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering 
and Value Creation1 
 
                    Steven L. Schwarcz2 
 
 
Abstract:  In recent years, companies have been shifting much of their 
transactional legal work from outside law firms to in-house lawyers, and 
some large companies now staff transactions almost exclusively in-house. 
Although this transformation redefines the very nature of the business 
lawyer, scholars have largely ignored it. This article seeks to remedy that 
omission, using empirical evidence as well as economic theory to help 
explain why in-house lawyers are taking over, and whether they are likely 
to continue to take over, these functions and roles of outside lawyers. The 
findings are surprising, suggesting that in-house lawyers may now be 
performing as high quality work as outside lawyers and that the 
reputational value of outside lawyers may be significantly diminishing.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 Improvements in reputation and skill of in-house lawyers and the recent growth of 
in-house legal departments mark a watershed in legal demographics.3 Although a need 
remains for outside law firms, especially in litigation, the relative distribution of work has 
changed. There has been a substantial shift towards more in-house lawyer transactional 
work in the past decade, with one survey showing approximately 68% of transactions 
currently lawyered in-house.4 
 
 Some large companies now rely almost exclusively on in-house counsel for their 
transactional legal work. Sears, for example, began building up its in-house legal 
department in the late 1990s, adding lawyers in areas like securities, tax, and real estate.5 
In real estate, its goal was to handle transactions from the beginning to the end.6 Many 
other companies have legal departments numbering in the hundreds, providing internally 
many of the same skills available from large outside law firms.7 
                                                 
3 In-house lawyers, sometimes also called inhouse or inside lawyers, work as employees 
of the company they represent, in contrast to outside lawyers or law firms who are 
retained by companies as independent contractors.  
4 Appendix A, at H.1 (average percentage of transactions reported to be lawyered in-
house). See also Appendix A, at H.3 (43% of general counsel respondents reporting a 
much higher percentage of in-house lawyered transactional work than 10 years ago, and 
30% reporting a slightly higher percentage); LARRY SMITH, INSIDE/OUTSIDE: HOW 
BUSINESSES BUY LEGAL SERVICES 227 (2001) (General Electric’s General Counsel 
Heineman estimating that in 1990 sixty percent of GE’s legal work was performed by 
outside counsel and forty percent by in-house counsel, but that by 2000 those numbers 
had reversed); Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment 
and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 482 (1989).  
5 SMITH, supra note 4, at 275. 
6 Id. (though local zoning matters often are given to outside counsel in the locality, who 
can handle them more efficiently). 
7 See, e.g., George P. Barker & Rachel Parkin, The Changing Structure of the Legal 
Services Industry and the Careers of Lawyers, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1635, 1654 (2006) 
(observing that “Corporate legal departments have exhibited significant growth since the 
early 1980s and have continued this trend in recent years. Between 1998 and 2004, the 
200 largest in-house legal departments grew from a total of 24,000 to 27,500 lawyers. 
Armed with more talent and the goal of cutting costs, corporate law departments are 
performing an increasing share of legal work in-house.”) (citations omitted). Cf. Abram 
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 This article examines the shift from outside to in-house “transactional 
lawyering”—meaning the structuring, negotiating, contract drafting, advisory, and 
opinion-giving process leading to “closing” a commercial, financing, or other business 
transaction.8 The shift appears to reflect a transformation in the relative value provided by 
in-house and outside transactional lawyers. This article uses empirical research and 
economic theory to examine that transformation, analyzing why in-house lawyers are 
taking over, and whether they are likely to continue to take over, the functions and roles 
of outside transactional lawyers. The findings suggest, among other things, that in-house 
lawyers may now be performing as high quality work as outside lawyers and that the 
reputational value of outside lawyers may be significantly diminishing. 
 
 Because this article focuses on transactional lawyering, subsequent references to 
“lawyer,” “counsel,” “lawyering,” and the like refer to lawyering in a transactional 
context.9 This article does not address such non-transactional lawyering roles as 
litigation, lobbying, or compliance work because those roles do not normally involve, as 
does transactional lawyering, head-to-head competition between outside and in-house 
counsel.10 Also, this article assumes that lawyers generally provide value in business 
transactions, and thus does not address such issues as whether lawyers add value 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. 
REV. 277, 278 (1985) (describing the potential of in-house legal services). 
8 A “closing” is the final stage of a business transaction when the documents and 
agreements are signed (and, as appropriate, filed with requisite government agencies) and 
the transaction is then funded or otherwise effectuated.  
9 This article also interchangeably uses the terms “counsel” and “lawyers.” 
10 This is not to say that non-transactional lawyering roles never involve head-to-head 
competition. Some law firms, for example, may be marketing their Sarbanes-Oxley 
expertise to clients, thereby potentially competing with in-house compliance lawyers. E-
mail from Gabe Shawn Varges, Chief Compliance Officer, Zurich Financial Services, to 
the author (Oct. 8, 2006) (observing that “a growth area for law firms is targeting those 
internal company processes carried out largely internally [such as Sarbanes-Oxley 
compliance] where the law firm can find a value-adding way of inserting itself”). In-
house and outside lawyers also occasionally may compete for litigation and lobbying 
work. [cite]  
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compared to having no lawyers involved in such transactions. Recent research confirms 
that lawyers do indeed add value.11 
 
 METHODOLOGY 
 The article first utilizes quantitative data, derived from the results of surveys,12 to 
test a range of hypotheses about the value or relative value provided by in-house and 
outside lawyers and to assess any transformation therein.13 The article then compares the 
resulting findings with the predictions of economic theory, using the insight that a 
decision whether to bring legal work in-house is a subset of the broader question of 
vertical integration: whether a company should make needed products in-house, or 
whether it should buy them (the classic “make-or-buy” decision).14  
 
 The recipient of value provided by in-house and outside lawyers is always 
primarily the client-company. The article therefore focuses on value from the company’s 
standpoint.15 The company’s general counsel (or other chief legal officer), as manager of 
the legal department, typically is responsible for assigning legal work, including the 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset 
Pricing, 94 YALE L. J. 239 (1984); Symposium, Business Lawyers and Value Creation 
for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1 et seq. (1995); Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of 
Transactional Lawyering (forthcoming 2007) (all these articles demonstrating that 
transactional lawyers do indeed add value, though sometimes disagreeing on what that 
value is). 
12 Cf. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) 
(observing that empirical data “may be … the results of interviews or surveys”). 
13 By “value,” this article essentially means monetary value. Gilson, supra note 11, at 243 
(arguing that if a lawyer adds value, the transaction must be worth more, net of legal fees, 
as a result of the lawyer’s participation). Cf. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 10 (2d ed. 1977) (defining value as “human satisfaction as measured by aggregate 
consumer willingness to pay for goods and services”). This would include not only 
lowering direct costs but also indirectly saving costs, such as reducing the time and effort 
that parties need to devote to a business transaction. Gilson, supra note 11, at 254 
(equating “cost-saving” with “value creation”). Value also may include less tangible (and 
thus less quantifiable) factors, such as quality of the work performed. 
14 See infra notes 195-207 and accompanying text (examining the make-or-buy decision). 
15 The article does not, however, focus on value creation from the standpoint of any 
single client. Even if a clever lawyer is able to negotiate a better deal for her client than a 
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decision whether to handle a matter in-house or to retain the services of outside counsel.16 
For survey purposes, the article thus treats the general counsel—or, where applicable, a 
person to whom the general counsel forwards the survey to respond—as a proxy for the 
client-company.  
 
 Treating the general counsel as a proxy for the client-company raises potential 
biases. Where (as often occurs) general counsel also are responsible for hiring in-house 
attorneys, general counsel may respond to the survey in ways that justify their hiring 
decisions. That, in turn, may slant some responses towards in-house lawyer value. There 
also may be a self-reporting bias insofar as general counsel, being in-house lawyers, view 
the role of in-house lawyers as more important and indispensable than it actually is.17 To 
mitigate these biases, as well as to serve as a reality check, this article additionally 
surveys a representative sample of outside lawyers.18 
                                                                                                                                                 
less clever lawyer is able to negotiate for his, that would not increase but would merely 
reallocate overall value in a zero-sum game. Gilson, supra note 11, at 244-45. 
16 See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 955, 960, 971 (2005). In fulfilling that responsibility, the general counsel must take 
into account such matters as budgetary concerns, the complexity of the matter in 
question, and the expertise of the in-house legal staff. Robert D. Rachlin, Successful 
Partnering Between Inside and Outside Counsel, 27 VT. B.J. 46, 47 (Dec. 2001) (book 
review). 
17 See, e.g., Robert E. Rosen, “We’re All Consultants Now”: How Change in Client 
Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal 
Services, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 638 (2002) (“The self-reports of elite actors, like lawyers, 
are especially suspect, for often they are speeches to an audience (other than the 
interviewer).”); Robert K. Rasmussen, Lawyers, Law and Contract Formation, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 2748, 2749-50 (2000) (discussing this tendency from the standpoint of lawyer 
self-reporting). 
18 The Outside Counsel Questionnaire was sent to all 54 outside lawyer respondents to a 
questionnaire recently distributed in connection with Explaining the Value of 
Transactional Lawyering, supra note 11. Those respondents, in turn, were originally part 
of a group of 500 lawyers in New York City, 211 lawyers in Philadelphia, and 270 
lawyers in Chicago randomly selected using a random number generator from a list of 
lawyers generated from the LexisNexis® Martindale-Hubbell® Lawyer Locator. See 
Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients 
Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 107-11 (1994) (using a similar 
sampling method). To qualify to receive a survey, the lawyer must concentrate the 
majority of his or her practice in corporate transactional work (including mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A), securities law, corporate finance, project finance, or structured 
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 The initial surveys were conducted using a ten-page questionnaire for general 
counsel as proxies for client-companies and a slightly modified, shorter questionnaire for 
outside lawyers. The forms of these general counsel and outside lawyer questionnaires 
are attached to this article as Annexes 1 and 2, respectively. The answers to several 
questions in the original general counsel questionnaire appeared to vary significantly 
depending on the number of attorneys in the company law department. To ensure 
statistical reliability, a subsequent survey was conducted using an abbreviated general 
counsel questionnaire focusing primarily on those questions.19  
 
 Survey methodology is potentially subject to flaws. Although surveys constitute 
“a primary source of data in . . .  the social sciences,”20 they are dependent on the precise 
wording, format, and context of the survey questions.21 Survey data also indicate what 
respondents (in this case, in-house and outside lawyers) say is the case, which may be 
different from what is actually the case.22 [Also discuss response rates to each form of 
questionnaire once all questionnaires are in.] Additionally, treating the general counsel as 
                                                                                                                                                 
finance) and be a partner or counsel at a law firm with at least fifty lawyers that is listed 
in the NALP DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS. 
19 The abbreviated general counsel questionnaire included only the following questions 
from the general counsel questionnaire shown on Annex 1: A.3, A.4, A.6, A.7, B.6, B.7, 
C.1, C.2, D.7, D.8, D.9, E.4, F.2, F.3, F.4, F.5, H.1. These included the several questions 
whose answers appeared to vary significantly—as well as all other questions whose 
answers conceivably might vary—depending on the number of attorneys in the company 
law department.  
20 Norbert Schwarz, Self Reports: How the Questions Shape the Answers, 54 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGISt 93, 93 (Feb. 1999). 
21 Id. (observing that surveys are a “fallible source of data [in that] minor changes in 
question wording, question format, or question context can result in major changes in the 
obtained results”). The questionnaires used in connection with this article did not, for 
example, attempt to distinguish types of transactional work or relative sizes of 
transactions.  
22 Thus, this article does not purport to measure the actual costs and benefits of using in-
house versus outside counsel; there may be a disconnect between what counsel report in 
the survey and what actually motivated them, and cognitive biases, lack of information, 
and the like may result in inaccurate perceptions of actual costs or benefits. In 
anonymous surveys, such as those conducted for this article, it also is possible that 
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a proxy for the client-company may bias some survey responses.23 Finally, to help 
discover flaws or biases as well as to provide a contrasting perspective, this article 
compares its empirical findings with the predictions of economic theory. Significant 
differences might suggest methodological errors. The results, however, turn out to be 
remarkably complementary.  
 
 HYPOTHESES 
 In accordance with the foregoing methodology, this article first empirically tests 
the following hypotheses: 1. Disintermediation24; 2. Reducing Agency Costs25; 3. 
Economies of Scale26; 4. Economies of Scope27; 5. Responsiveness and Ease of 
Communications28; 6. Reputational Intermediary29; 7. Client Privilege and 
Confidentiality30; 8. Dynamic Equilibrium.31 These hypotheses—representing what 
appears to be the universe of plausible hypotheses about the value or relative value 
provided by in-house and outside counsel—were compiled from scholarly literature,32 
practitioner literature, feedback on draft questionnaires, and the author’s experience as a 
transactional lawyer.33 As the discussion below shows, there is some overlap among 
certain of these hypotheses. 
 
 Each of these hypotheses is further explained below. 
                                                                                                                                                 
respondents may be careless in their responses since they are not personally accountable 
for them. 
23 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
24 This hypothesis is discussed infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text. 
25 This hypothesis is discussed infra notes 43-57 and accompanying text. 
26 This hypothesis is discussed infra notes 58-70 and accompanying text. 
27 This hypothesis is discussed infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text. 
28 This hypothesis is discussed infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. 
29 This hypothesis is discussed infra notes 82-98 and accompanying text. 
30 This hypothesis is discussed infra notes 100-106 and accompanying text. 
31 This hypothesis is discussed infra notes 106-111 and accompanying text. 
32 Including the economic theory literature discussed infra notes 193-232 and 
accompanying text. 
33 The author represented clients in transactions involving corporate finance, structured 
finance, and securities law from 1974 through 1989 as an associate and then partner at the 
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 1. Disintermediation.   This hypothesis predicts that in-house counsel are, other 
factors being equal, less costly than outside counsel because, by bringing lawyers in-
house, companies can achieve a disintermediation of legal services—removing the need 
for outside lawyers and therefore avoiding the profit component charged for their 
services.34 This profit component represents the higher average incomes of outside 
lawyers at comparable experience levels,35 including—even in non-partner billing—a 
contribution towards partnership profits.36  
 
 Disintermediation also may be able to reduce costs by eliminating “the learning 
curve for outside counsel [as well as] the myriad small costs of doing business, such as 
visits to the client, talking through the issues, etc., that add up significantly from start to 
                                                                                                                                                 
law firm of Shearman & Sterling and from 1989 through 1996 as partner and chairman of 
the Structured Finance Practice Group at the Kaye Scholer law firm. 
34 Although the cost of outside counsel is high for at least two other reasons—law firms 
compete with investment banks for top transactional people, and the pool of “top tier” 
law students is artificially constrained by low law-school class size whereas hiring 
demand has risen dramatically (see Ellen Rosen, Street Scene, For New Lawyers, The 
Going Rate Has Gone Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2006, at C7)—disintermediation cannot 
reduce these costs because companies themselves, when they hire lawyers to work as in-
house counsel, face the same market constraints. 
35 See, e.g., Press Release, National Association for Law Placement, Salaries Up at 
Largest Firms for First Time Since 2000 (Aug. 01, 2006) (on file with author & available 
at http://www.nalp.org/press/details.php?id=62) (observing median starting income of 
first year law firm associates of $105,000 compared to corresponding median salary for 
corporate staff attorneys of only $96,000). This article uses the term “income” when 
referring to outside lawyer compensation because outside lawyers are independent 
contractors of their clients, and the term “salary” when referring to in-house lawyer 
compensation because in-house lawyers are employees of their clients. See supra note 3. 
36 See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibility and the Bottom Line: The 
Ethics of Billing, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 261, 262 (1996) (noting that “firms have increased 
attorneys’ billable hour requirements in the pursuit of greater partnership profits”). Cf. 
James E. Karlovich, Profitability: Improving the Bottom Line, 560 PLI/COMM 307, 313-
314 (1990) (noting correlation between law firm billing rates and partner income). 
Compensation, however, is market driven, and this article later questions whether outside 
lawyer incomes will always be higher than in-house lawyer salaries. See infra notes 106-
111  and accompanying text (discussing the “Dynamic Equilibrium” hypothesis) 
(discussing why in-house lawyer salaries are lower, and whether they are likely to remain 
lower). 
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finish.”37 There is little question that learning curve costs are real. In the 1980s, 
companies sent almost all of their legal work to multiple outside law firms, believing that 
would lead to more competitive pricing. The results, however, were disappointing; 
companies repeatedly had to educate new firms about their operations.38 The more 
complex the company’s regulatory, organizational, and operational structures, the greater 
the cost of this education.39 
 
 At least partly in response to economic and competitive pressures to cut these 
costs, many companies have increased the size and responsibilities of their in-house legal 
departments.40 Disintermediation alone, however, cannot fully explain the cost saving 
because companies pay the full salaries of in-house counsel whereas they pay only the 
portion of outside lawyer income allocated to the company’s legal work. Therefore, any 
downtime in the use of in-house counsel would reduce the cost saving, except to the 
extent that such counsel can be redirected to other useful activities.41 Furthermore, the 
cost saving of using in-house counsel may be exaggerated because, unlike outside 
                                                 
37 SMITH, supra note 4, at 245. This article discusses learning curves in the context of the 
disintermediation and other hypotheses. Disintermediation also can reduce costs to the 
extent outside counsel billing practices are rife with over-billing and other inefficiencies. 
In-house counsel monitoring of outside counsel billing, however, can mitigate any such 
inefficiencies. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text). 
38 SMITH, supra note 4, at 175. See also id. at 223 (observing that “Richard Cotton [the 
general counsel of GE’s subsidiary, NBC] told OF COUNSEL magazine that he foresaw 
increasingly less use of law firms, and he, for one, looked forward to ‘ no longer having 
to finance the education of outside counsel.’”). 
39 Cf. E-mail from Gray McCalley, infra note 64 
40 Peter J. Gardner, A Role for the Business Attorney in the Twenty-First Century: Adding 
Value to the Client’s Enterprise in the Knowledge Economy, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 17, 32-33 (2003) (arguing that companies have found that a great deal of their legal 
work can be done in-house for significantly lower cost than what outside law firms would 
charge). See also ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRMS 57 (1988) (arguing that the increased cost 
of legal services, driven by increased regulation and expanded business operations, helps 
explain the shift to in-house counsel); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law Firms, Competition 
Penalties, and the Values of Professionalism, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 30 (1999) 
(observing that “as legal services have become a more significant component of its 
budget, the corporation has begun to internalize more of the provision of legal services by 
greatly expanding the size and role of its in-house legal department.”). 
41 Cf. infra note 62 and accompanying text.  
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lawyers who actually bill for their legal services, in-house lawyer charges are usually 
internally imputed to the business units that use their services.42 Therefore, the price of 
using outside counsel may be perceived as higher or more tangible than the price of using 
in-house counsel.43  
 
 2. Reducing Agency Costs.   This hypothesis predicts that in-house counsel can 
more effectively reduce agency costs than outside counsel.  
 
 There are two types of agency costs at issue. The first are the well-known agency 
costs resulting from the conflict between a company’s ownership and management. 
According to this hypothesis, in-house counsel are in a better position than outside 
counsel to observe any misbehavior by company managers.44 In-house counsel’s informal 
day-to-day interactions with other corporate employees give them access to information 
through back channels that would rarely, if ever, be available to outside counsel.45 In-
house counsel also may be in a better position than outside counsel to bring “client” 
misbehavior to the attention of senior management,46 though some in-house counsel may 
fail to investigate or to report suspected corporate wrongdoing due to fear of retaliatory 
action by management or a desire to be considered a team player.47   
                                                 
42 Cf. Gary R. Garrett, PhD, Litigation Service Market Update. . . A Summary for 
Lawyers and Litigation Support Companies, OF COUNSEL, Dec. 2004, at 5, 8 
(“Indications are that a number of corporations have concluded that large in-house legal 
departments are more expensive than well-managed outside counsel.”). 
43 Of course, changes in the way companies allocate in-house counsel costs could change 
these perceptions. 
44 Demott, supra note 16, at 966 (“Somewhat paradoxically, [in-house] counsel’s 
embedded position within a corporation, which underlies counsel’s ability to function 
proactively, also places counsel in an environment rich with information that may require 
uncomfortable choices.”). 
45 Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 999 (2005). 
46 Cf. [proposed reporting requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley and MRPC]. 
47 See generally Kim, supra note 45. If in-house counsel more effectively monitor 
managers to reduce these agency costs, one might think that, at least on margin, some 
managers (i.e., those wanting the freedom to act in their personal best interests) would 
prefer hiring outside counsel. The company’s general counsel, however—not the 
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 The second type of agency cost can result from the conflict between the company 
and its outside law firm. For example, outside counsel who bill by the hour may have less 
motivation than in-house counsel to close a transaction quickly.48 Outside counsel also 
may be motivated to assign more senior attorneys than needed in order to bill at a higher 
rate.49  
 
 This second type of agency cost, however, may be manageable through 
monitoring and convergence.50 Being part of the client organization, in-house counsel can 
monitor outside counsel,51 “question[ing] fees, deny[ing] disbursements, and insist[ing] 
on strict case management procedures.”52 Some in-house counsel, such as GE’s legal 
department, have established clear procedures to be followed by outside law firms in 
certain areas (e.g., patent application) to ensure quality and efficiency.53 In-house counsel 
also may request and review budgets prepared by outside counsel. This, and negotiating 
“blended rates” (billing rate for a team of lawyers based on a rough average of the rates 
for each individual), can help eliminate perverse incentives for outside counsel to be 
inefficient.54  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
managers actually working on transactions—usually decides in the first instance which 
counsel to use. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
48 Joel F. Henning, Law Firms and Legal Department: Can’t We All Get Along?, 7 BUS. 
L. TODAY 24, 28 (Aug. 1998) (observing that “In a recent survey, more than one-third of 
outside counsel admitted that the prospect of billing additional hours at least sometimes 
influences their decisions to undertake work that they wouldn’t otherwise have 
performed”). 
49 Cf. WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED BILLING BY 
ATTORNEYS 94 (1996) (observing cases where courts reduced fee awards because senior 
attorneys performed work that should have been handled by more junior lawyers). 
50 “Convergence” is defined and discussed infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
51 Rosen, supra note 4, at 487. Although non-legal managers could likewise monitor 
outside counsel, such managers, not being lawyers, would not speak the same language or 
understand the issues as well as outside counsel. 
52 SMITH, supra note 4, at 154. 
53 Id. at 230. 
54 Id. at 16. 
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 The second type of agency cost also may be able to be managed through 
“convergence,” or reducing “the number of law firms on [the company’s] approved 
list.”55 Although the stated goal of convergence is to foster stronger relationships between 
the company and the chosen firms, it can help to reduce the learning-curve costs of 
outside law firms.56 Convergence also may be able to make it easier for in-house counsel 
to perform their role of monitoring outside counsel because there are not as many firms to 
track.57  
 
 3. Economies of Scale.   An economy of scale is the savings resulting from the 
greater efficiency of large-scale processes.58 This hypothesis predicts that in-house 
counsel sometimes can achieve better economies of scale than outside counsel, and vice 
versa.   
 
 In-house counsel may be able to achieve better economies of scale than outside 
counsel, for example, when handling large numbers of transactions that are repetitive to 
their company.59 Even complex repetitive transactions sometimes may be able to be 
performed more efficiently by in-house counsel. Thus,  
 
the ‘vast majority’ of Oracle’s legal matters involve customer ‘out-
licensing’ when other companies use Oracle systems. These matters are 
not simple, but involve ‘tricky issues’ with challenging variations from 
one national venue to another. No outside law firm can possibly do this 
                                                 
55 SMITH, supra note 4, at 173. 
56 Id. 
57 SMITH, supra note 4, at 173. See also id. at 167-69 (discussing a matrix system that ties 
payment to outside counsel to compliance with cost projections as a form of management 
by in-house counsel). 
58 CAMPBELL R. HARVEY, HYPERTEXTUAL FINANCE GLOSSARY, available at 
http://www.duke.edu/~charvey/Classes/wpg/bfglose.htm. 
59 SMITH, supra note 4, at 245 (identifying Jeff Kindler, then General Counsel of 
McDonald’s, as “one example of a whole generation of in-house counsel that have 
concluded . . . that repetitive, non-litigation legal work will usually be handled more cost 
effectively in-house”). See also id. at 70 (discussing that the fairly common assumption 
“that large law firms are by definition the most expensive source of legal work” often 
proves to be true). 
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work better, or with more intimate familiarity of the specific facts relevant 
to specific Oracle products, than Oracle’s own lawyers.60 
 
 As companies expand in size, they therefore may find it efficient to hire full-time 
in-house counsel to address these types of transactions.61 Even absent large numbers of 
repetitive transactions, companies still may find it efficient to hire in-house counsel so 
long as “staff can be redirected to handle a variety of other client matters as well.”62 To 
the extent in-house staff cannot be redirected, however, hiring outside counsel can help to 
smooth out a fluctuating transactional workload which, if addressed by hiring in-house 
counsel, would result in future excess capacity.63  
 
 For transactions that a company does not engage in repetitively, economies of 
scale may favor outside counsel who frequently engage in that type of transaction and 
therefore are able to apportion to more than one client the cost of gaining experience and 
expertise. Because the cost of gaining experience and expertise is even higher for 
complex transactions, economies of scale would favor outside counsel even more. For 
example, “in its representation of J.P. Morgan and Société Générale in connection with 
the joint acquisition of Seagrams Wine and Spirits from Vivendi by Group Pernod Ricard 
and Diageo PLC, the Jones, Day law firm counseled its clients on governing law in eight 
jurisdictions, including the United States, Australia, France, Japan, and Spain. In-house 
buyers cannot now rely on their own legal staffs, or on smaller firms or law firm 
                                                 
60 SMITH, supra note 4, at 67 (referencing conversation with Daniel Cooperman, General 
Counsel of Oracle Corporation). 
61 [Try to get critical mass data. cite] 
62 SMITH, supra note 4, at 245 (discussing interview with Jeff Kindler, General Counsel 
of McDonald’s). 
63 Cf. supra note 41 and accompanying text (observing that any downtime in the use of 
in-house counsel could reduce the cost saving from disintermediation). See also Carl D. 
Liggio, Sr., A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel: Back to the Future—Or is it the 
Past?, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 629 (2002) (observing that “judicious use of outside counsel 
will be made in those areas where the inside lawyers have not developed the expertise to 
provide the needed legal services or where the workload does not permit it”). 
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networks, for such comprehensive advice in such a recondite area. Chances are they 
never will.”64  
 
 Economies of scale also may favor outside counsel in large deals, where legal fees 
are relatively small compared to overall transaction costs and benefits. Thus, although 
Caterpillar “does most of its major transactions in-house, . . .  it has used some M&A 
[law firm] powerhouses . . . for billion dollar deals.”65 
 
 The discussion above focuses on economies of scale that are a function of lawyer 
expertise and experience. The relative value provided by in-house and outside counsel 
also may depend on logistical economies of scale. For example, some law firms may 
achieve savings and help facilitate timely closings through large back-office service 
departments—such as proofreading, photocopying, word processing, and other support 
staff, including paralegals—that could only be cost-justified by a large volume of 
transactions.66  
 
 Law libraries also can provide logistical economies of scale. Because most 
companies cannot afford to maintain extensive law libraries for their in-house counsel,67 
they have been almost completely dependent until recently on large law firms as the 
                                                 
64 SMITH, supra note 4, at 78. Cf. E-mail to the author from Gray McCalley, Jr., Vice 
President & General Counsel, Printpack, Inc. (July 26, 2006) (observing that “many in 
house counsel may never get more than one opportunity to do a complicated transaction 
which, on the other hand, may be the daily bread of  the outside lawyer. . . .  As an in 
house lawyer with competing priorities, if I am faced with a choice of doing a one-off 
transaction or doing a transaction that I will likely see again, and assuming that they both 
provide me with a first-time learning opportunity, it makes more sense for me to do the 
deal that is going to repeat because I can assure future cost avoidance that way . . . .”). 
65 SMITH, supra note 4, at 255. 
66 See, e.g., e-mail from Karl S. Okamoto, Senior Managing Director, Atticus Capital 
LLC, to the author (April 24, 2006) (observing that “[s]imple manpower (i.e., willingness 
to work at all hours while keeping proofreading quality high, meals served and cabs 
available) is often the explanation” for an outside transactional law firm’s value). 
Okamoto’s observation also may help to explain the failure of in-house counsel to replace 
outside litigation counsel, litigation being even more manpower and process intensive 
than transactional lawyering. 
67 Liggio, supra note 63, at 625. 
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keepers of legal knowledge.68 With the introduction of Lexis and the Internet in the late 
1970s, however, law firms appear to have lost much of this powerful economy of scale:  
 
The advent of the internet with its access to vast amounts of information, 
including a considerable number of legal resources, has changed the door 
from being slight ajar [as a result of Lexis] to being almost wide open. 
This, coupled with the increasing number of computer literate lawyers 
joining corporate law departments, is materially altering the balance of 
power. The outside law firm’s once almost monopolistic control of that 
gateway to legal knowledge is broken.69  
 
For large companies, moreover, the increasing size of in-house legal departments—some 
rivaling the size of the largest law firms and thus being able to afford large law libraries 
and back office services70—may be reducing the advantage that these logistical 
economies of scale give to outside law firms.  
 
 4. Economies of Scope.  An economy of scope represents the savings resulting 
from having the same investment support multiple profitable activities in combination 
rather than separately.71 This hypothesis predicts that in-house counsel who are already 
familiar with their company’s regulation and its organizational and operational structure 
may be able to achieve economies of scope72 by avoiding the learning curve of having to 
                                                 
68 Id. at 625, 633. 
69 Id. (although noting that, in its early days, Lexis was rather expensive and required 
computer skills that many lawyers did not have). The Internet also helps in-house counsel 
gain access to forms and templates that previously were more exclusively the province of 
outside lawyers. See infra note 126. 
70 Cf. John H. McGuckin Jr., CORPORATE LAW DEPARTMENTS: The Ethical Dilemma 
of the In-house Counsel, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2002, at 31, 32 (observing that “[d]uring the 
1980s, more and more large corporations turned inward for legal services, founding and 
expanding in-house legal departments that rivaled many corporate law firms in size . . .”). 
71 HARVEY, supra note 58. 
72 The distinction between economy of scope and economy of scale tends to blur in this 
context, however. This article treats avoiding the learning curve as an economy of scope 
in the sense that the same investment—teaching in-house counsel about the company—
supports multiple legal transactions by such counsel. But avoiding the learning curve also 
could be viewed as an economy of scale in the sense that in-house counsel, by counseling 
multiple transactions for a company, apportion the costs of learning about the company. 
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become educated about these matters.73 The learning curve also may be able to be 
reduced through convergence of outside law firms.74 When a company reduces the 
number of law firms it uses to a relatively small number, those firms may have more 
incentive—and through deal concentration naturally may tend—to develop in-firm 
expertise about the company.75  
 
 Aside from the learning-curve economy of scope, this hypothesis also predicts 
that an outside law firm may be able to achieve economies of scope by offering the client 
a range of legal expertise that the client does not have in-house.   
 
 5. Responsiveness and Ease of Communications.   This hypothesis predicts that 
in-house counsel are generally more responsive to and can better communicate with the 
“client” than outside counsel.76  
 
 It has been reported that “[o]fficials of corporations maintaining corporate counsel 
generally stress convenience, rapid service, and better understanding of their problems as 
the principal advantages of having their own law department rather than using outside 
counsel.”77 These advantages may result in part from the physical proximity of a 
company’s in-house counsel and management, often having offices in the same building 
                                                                                                                                                 
Outside counsel unfamiliar with the company may have to incur this cost even for a one-
off transaction. 
73 Cf. E-mail from Gray McCalley, supra note 64 (observing that in-house counsel also 
save costs by understanding the company’s culture, since “any transaction, both the 
substance and the conduct thereof, will reflect a company’s culture and values. In house 
is much better positioned to ‘apply’ this. In house lawyers can also better manage (or at 
least are better positioned to manage) the client during the transaction, e.g. by defining 
success and using that as a management process as the transaction proceeds, thus 
managing expectations and assisting in identifying areas for compromise or 
concession.”).  
74 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (defining convergence as reducing the 
number of law firms used by the company). 
75 [cite; mention also SLS experience at S&S re Citibank/Citicorp] 
76 [Discuss IFLR or EuroMoney survey on importance of responsiveness. cite] 
77 JOHN D. DONNELL, THE CORPORATE COUNSEL: A ROLE STUDY 29 (1970). 
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if not on the same floor.78 At least at the outset of a transaction, management also may 
find it easier to communicate with in-house counsel, who presumably are more familiar 
with the company’s business than outside counsel and with whom management may have 
regular contact.79 Perhaps for this reason, in-house counsel seem to get involved at earlier 
stages of transactions than outside counsel, often helping (more than outside counsel 
could) to actually structure transactions.80 Indeed, “[t]he very existence of a properly 
established inside counsel pushes back the involvement of lawyers to an earlier phase of a 
transaction and shifts the mode from reactive to proactive.”81  
 
 In-house counsel who are more familiar with the client than outside counsel may 
also be more comfortable rendering informal legal advice. Although risky, this 
sometimes could be valuable for business managers who need to make time sensitive 
business decisions.82 
 
 6. Reputational Intermediary.   This hypothesis predicts that outside counsel are 
better reputational intermediaries than in-house counsel.  
 
 Particularly for complex transactions, law firms historically have tended to have 
better reputations than in-house counsel.83 The reputations of outside counsel may be 
                                                 
78 For these same reasons, in-house counsel of a regulated company would be expected to 
be able to work more efficiently with in-house regulatory counsel than would outside 
counsel. 
79 Liggio, supra note 63, at 634. 
80 See Appendix A, at E.4 (77% of general counsel respondents report that in-house 
counsel are typically more involved in structuring a client’s business transactions than 
outside lawyers). [Compare SLS Enron deposition testimony on V&E’s involvement: like 
a typical outside lawyer, only getting involved when outside lawyers receive a term sheet. 
Also, expand on perceptions of managers sensing outside counsel’s “meter running.”] 
81 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 7, at 281. 
82 See SMITH, supra note 4, at 247 (“After a while on the job, inside lawyers ‘get it.’ They 
recognize that their duty is to give the best possible answer they can, but also that an 
answer is more valuable at a 50% level of certainty today than a week from today at 
90%.). 
83 [cite] 
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enhanced by their independence and, at least heretofor, by their firms’ ability to hire the 
best lawyers—or at least the best students from the most prestigious law schools.84  
 
 The reputations of in-house legal departments are rapidly growing, however, and 
some in-house legal departments have very good reputations indeed.85 In-house counsel 
are increasingly viewed as competent to handle complex legal matters.86 In the late 
1980s, in-house legal departments began attracting higher caliber practitioners and, by 
the late 1990s, partners from firms all over the country were leaving for in-house 
positions.87 Legal work posing significant risk is no longer always automatically sent to 
outside counsel.88 Furthermore, in-house legal departments are beginning to specialize 
more. For example, the number of specialty areas practiced by GE in-house attorneys has 
grown from “about 10 to approximately 17,”89 and recently added specialty areas include 
commercial transactions and e-commerce.90 
 
 There may still be a significant reputational gap between in-house and outside 
counsel, however, in the giving of third-party legal opinions. These are legal opinions, 
spanning the entire range of business and financial undertakings, issued by counsel for 
one party but addressed to third parties such as financiers of credit or investors.91 
                                                 
84 [cite] 
85 [cite and give examples] Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 11, Appendix A at B.1 (finding that 
outside lawyers have a somewhat higher opinion than clients of the extent to which a 
highly reputed law firm contributes to the success of a transaction, perhaps indicating that 
general counsel with confidence in their own staff do not see as much of a need to hire 
outside law firms). 
86 Rosen, supra note 4, at 483. 
87 SMITH, supra note 4, at 216. 
88 Rosen, supra note 4, at 483. 
89 SMITH, supra note 4, at 224. 
90 Id. [May want to try and do informal interview with GC at GE] There are, nonetheless, 
concerns about specialization. In-house lawyer specialists may not develop the business 
skills and understanding that have traditionally been such an important part of the in-
house lawyer’s role. SMITH, supra note 4, at 222. Furthermore, specialization could lead 
to myopia—a tendency to view the world too much from the perspective of the 
specialties. Id. 
91 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance,  
84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005). 
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Requiring outside counsel to issue these opinions helps assure the independence—and 
hence, the integrity—of the opinions.92 The reputational gap in part may result from 
perceptions (if not the reality) that outside counsel have greater expertise than in-house 
counsel as well as a stronger culture of legal opinion-giving. Furthermore, where outside 
counsel give legal opinions, there is an additional “deep pocket” besides the company to 
sue if the opinion is wrong—the law firm rendering the opinion.93 For these reasons, 
third-party legal opinions rendered by in-house counsel still may not be considered to be 
as credible as those rendered by outside counsel for the company.    
 
 Although reputational value has been viewed as the most agreed-upon scholarly 
theory of the value added by transactional lawyers,94 some are beginning to question its 
importance.95 Furthermore, any reputational gap would diminish if outside-law-firm 
reputation falls. This could occur for at least two reasons. Larger size may make it more 
expensive and less practical for a law firm to monitor the quality of its lawyers.96 
(Perhaps for this reason, companies now say that they hire outside legal expertise based 
more on individual lawyers than on the law firm per se.97) Also, the increasing shift of 
outside law firm organization from traditional partnerships to limited liability 
                                                 
92 Id. at 9-10. 
93 Compare e-mail from Gabe Shawn Varges, supra note 10 (observing that outside law 
firm legal “opinions—backed by their malpractice insurance—is something that internal 
lawyers often look for,” and later in that e-mail describing such a legal opinion as a “risk-
shifting mechanism”), with Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 
OR. L. REV. 15, 32 (1995) (finding that, at least in a securities offering context, an in-
house counsel legal opinion on “legality” suffices for “the most platinum-plated of 
issuers”). 
94 See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 40, at 46-48; Okamoto, supra note 93, at 43. 
95 See Schwarcz, supra note 11 (finding only weak support for the proposition that 
transactional lawyers add value by acting as reputational intermediaries). Cf. Rosen, 
supra note 4, at 494: “The emergence of corporate legal departments simply reflects 
decreasing corporate need for the legitimation afforded by independent lawyering.” 
96 E-mail from Victor Fleischer, Acting Professor of Law, UCLA Law School, to the 
author (April 19, 2006) (arguing that “it becomes awfully costly to monitor other 
partners, and thereby protect the value of the firm’s reputational capital, as firms grow in 
size. . . . [P]artners may monitor each other to make sure that no one is slacking off. But 
monitoring is costly and imperfect, [and] many aspects of, say, due diligence, are not 
easy to monitor without duplication of effort.”). 
97 E-mail from Gray McCalley, supra note 64.  
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partnerships may signal that law firm partners are no longer as willing to stand behind 
their firm’s good name.98 
 
 7. Client Privilege and Confidentiality.   This hypothesis predicts that outside 
counsel afford clients greater privilege and confidentiality than in-house counsel.  
 
 Although in-house counsel are theoretically afforded the same privilege as outside 
counsel,99 the privilege only applies to communications that constitute “legal” rather than 
“business” advice made to someone who qualifies as a client.100 It is often difficult to 
distinguish in-house counsel “legal” advice from “business” advice because the former 
must be not only “primarily legal in nature” but also “made in the attorney’s professional 
legal capacity.”101 That is a difficult determination “[s]ince every conversation that in-
house counsel has with his company likely relates in some way to the company’s 
business.”102 Additionally, there may be ambiguity as to whether the advice is given to a 
“client,” a determination that is subject to conflicting tests.103 A “control group” test 
limits clients to company employees “in a position to control or to take a substantial part 
in directing the company’s response to legal advice.”104 Federal courts, however, apply a 
“subject matter” test, which requires only that “the communication [is] made at the 
direction of corporate superiors and the subject matter of the communication is within the 
scope of the employee’s corporate duties.”105  
 
                                                 
98 [cite to that shift, and also to its impact on reputational value] 
99 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. i (2000) (“The 
privilege under this Section applies without distinction to lawyers who are inside legal 
counsel or outside legal counsel”). 
100 Albert L. Vreeland, II & Jennifer L. Howard, The Care and Feeding of In-House 
Counsel, 67 ALA. LAW. 340, 346-47 (2006). 
101 Id. at 346. 
102 Id. (arguing that, for this reason, the distinction between “legal” and “business” advice 
is “about as clear as mud”). 
103 Id. at 347. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. (federal courts apply the subject matter test following Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 
383 (1981), rejecting the control group test). 
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 To complicate matters further, outside counsel in foreign jurisdictions are often 
afforded a greater privilege than in-house counsel106 and, in some foreign jurisdictions, 
in-house counsel are not recognized as lawyers and therefore afforded no privilege.107 
 
 8. Dynamic Equilibrium.   This hypothesis—in truth more of a “meta”-hypothesis 
because it does not explain relative value as much as it explains how relative value 
changes—predicts that the relative value provided by in-house and outside lawyers 
fluctuates over time, although at certain times it may appear to be in equilibrium. Thus, 
although “theoretically, all corporate legal functions can be outsourced to law firms,” 
there has been “an almost three-decade [expansion and contraction] of work going inside 
one day and outside the next, of in-house staff being reduced one year and increased the 
next.”108  
 
 The first seven hypotheses may help to explain the dynamic equilibrium. For 
example, if disintermediation is causing a shift to in-house lawyering, the shift could 
reverse if in-house lawyer costs rise relative to outside lawyer fees. That might occur if 
in-house lawyers were no longer to receive the quality-of-life benefits that originally 
attracted them to their relatively lower paying jobs,109 a scenario not entirely far-fetched: 
“There may have been some truth to . . . claims [that in-house lawyers do not work as 
                                                 
106 Cf. Should In-House Counsel be More Privileged in the US than in the EU?, 7 BUS. L. 
INT’L 1 (2006). 
107 E-mail from Peter A. Joy, Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis, to 
the author (October 24, 2006) (observing that “[o]n the status of corporate counsel around 
the world, in many countries the in-house counsel are not considered full-fledged 
lawyers. For example, in Japan a full lawyer, bengoshi, loses the right to be a bengoshi if 
he takes a job in-house. As a result, most of the in-house ‘lawyers’ have never been 
bengoshi and are not admitted to practice law. In many countries around the world there 
is some version of this resulting in different treatment for in-housel counsel and outside 
counsel when it comes to attorney client privilege and confidentiality. France and Italy 
are two such countries.”). 
108 SMITH, supra note 4, at 216. 
109 Cf. infra notes 172-173 and accompanying text (finding that even though in-house 
counsel salaries are presently less than outside counsel incomes, companies are able to 
compete in hiring by offering in-house counsel a better lifestyle). See also supra notes 
35-36 and accompanying text (discussing that salaries of in-house counsel tend to be 
lower than the incomes earned by outside lawyers at comparable levels). 
 In-House Lawyering.doc 
22
hard as law-firm lawyers] ten years ago, but now working in-house can be just as 
demanding as firm jobs.”110 Similarly, to the extent economies of scale are causing a shift 
to in-house lawyering, the shift likewise could reverse if, for example, repetitive 
transactions were to decrease or complex transactions and average deal size were to 
increase.111  
 
 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 This part sets forth and examines the results of the surveys that were used to test 
the foregoing hypotheses about the value of in-house and outside counsel. The article 
thereafter compares these findings with economic theory.112 References below to general 
counsel respondents mean respondents to the Company’s General Counsel 
Questionnaire113; references below to outside lawyer respondents mean respondents to 
the Outside Counsel Questionnaire.114  
 
 Remarkably, there are only a handful of significant differences in the data 
reported by general counsel respondents and outside lawyer respondents.115 The high 
degree of congruence suggests a corresponding reliability of the data.116 The few 
significant differences suggest perception gaps that, if bridged, can help inform outside 
counsel who wish to make themselves more competitive.    
 
                                                 
110 SMITH, supra note 4, at 283. See also id. at 275-76 (discussing why in-house counsel 
salaries may increase relative to law firm compensation). 
111 See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between 
these factors and economies of scale). 
112 See Comparing the Findings with Economic Theory, infra. 
113 See Annex 1 (Company’s General Counsel Questionnaire). 
114 See Annex 2 (Outside Counsel Questionnaire). 
115 These differences are in assessing the importance of the learning curve to hiring 
decisions (infra note 120 and accompanying text); in assessing who is more likely to 
report management misbehavior (infra note 131 and accompanying text; but cf. infra 
notes 129-130 and accompanying text (observing that this difference has little practical 
importance)); in assessing who is more responsive to the client (infra note 158 and 
accompanying text); and in assessing whether the need for quality work is a relevant 
factor in the hiring decision (infra note 170 and accompanying text). 
116 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
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 Disintermediation Hypothesis Compared with Empirical Findings.  General 
counsel respondents almost universally regard in-house counsel as the lower cost option. 
Two primary reasons appear to explain this cost differential: the learning curve of having 
to educate outside lawyers about the company’s organization and operations,117 and the 
lower effective hourly rate of in-house counsel.118  
 
 Although outside lawyer respondents recognize the second reason for the cost 
differential—the lower effective hourly rate of in-house counsel119—they seem to have 
myopia regarding the importance attached by general counsel to the learning curve. 
Indeed, relatively few outside lawyer respondents recognize learning curves as an 
important factor in the hiring decision.120   
 
 This suggests an opportunity for outside counsel to try to increase efficiency and 
maintain their competitiveness. Law firms may be able to reduce learning curve costs, for 
example, by developing more institutional knowledge about the client and better teaching 
that knowledge to new lawyers. Admittedly, though, this may not be economically 
feasible for clients whose billings represent only a small percentage of a law firm’s 
revenues. Furthermore, institutional knowledge is not the same as individual lawyer 
knowledge. Although a law firm could attempt to translate institutional knowledge into 
individual lawyer knowledge through in-firm educational programs, those programs 
                                                 
117 Appendix A, at A.3 (85% of general counsel respondents citing this as a factor helping 
to explain the cost differential). 
118 Appendix A, at A.3 (83% of general counsel respondents citing this as a factor helping 
to explain the cost differential). 
119 See Appendix A, at A.5. The lower effective hourly rate of in-house counsel is indeed 
important and may well become more important if, as 91% of general counsel 
respondents believe, law firm billing rates are increasing more rapidly than in-house 
counsel costs. This is notwithstanding the efforts by many law firms to reduce costs by 
switching from all-equity partnerships to two-tier partnerships that include non-equity 
partners. Cf. William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier 
Partnerships in the AM LAW 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691 (2006). But cf. Appendix A, at 
A.5 (indicating that only a third of outside lawyer respondents believe that law firm 
billing rates are increasing more rapidly than in-house counsel costs). 
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would be costly and their cost would be exacerbated by the high turnover rate within law 
firms.121 A law firm also might attempt to minimize the knowledge differential by 
assigning lawyers to work more closely with particular clients. From an individual’s 
standpoint, however, a lawyer so assigned might not receive as broad training, and 
therefore might not be as valuable, as one who works with a range of clients. And, from 
the law firm’s standpoint, a lawyer so assigned is more likely to be hired away by the 
client.  
 
 The findings also confirm the possibility that cost differentials are artificially 
magnified,122 in that in-house counsel costs are generally viewed as less transparent to 
senior management than outside lawyer fees.123 If and when these costs become equally 
transparent, the shift towards in-house lawyering may slow down or even reverse.124  
 
 In that context, there are several reasons why outside lawyers are sometimes 
lower-cost providers of legal services. They may, for example, have more extensive 
knowledge of the relevant transactional law than in-house counsel,125 although outside 
                                                                                                                                                 
120 Appendix A, at A.3 (only 50% of outside lawyer respondents, compared to 85% of 
general counsel respondents, citing this as a factor helping to explain the cost 
differential).  
121 See, e.g., Leigh Jones, Mentoring Plans Failing Associates, High Attrition Rates Still 
Hit Firms Hard, 29 NAT’L L. J. 1 (Sep. 18, 2006) (reporting that “[a]ssociate attrition at 
law firms is 78% by the time attorneys are in their fifth year of practice”); Walter 
Dellinger & Brian P. Brooks, Reimagining Attorney Development, 29 NAT’L L. J. at S1 
(Sep. 25, 2006) (observing that “by one estimate, nearly 50% of any given group of 
entering associates likely will leave the [law] firm within three years”). 
122 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
123 Thirty-four percent of general counsel respondents believe in-house counsel costs are 
less transparent than outside counsel costs compared to only 14% who believe those costs 
are equally transparent. Appendix A, at A.8.  
124 But cf. e-mail from Gabe Shawn Varges, supra note 10 (suggesting that part of the 
lack of transparency of the cost of using in-house counsel is “the Club Med phenomenon: 
people may perceive costs to be lower when they pay once and all services are included 
in that fee, than if they are individually billed for each service”). If true, some lack of 
transparency may be inherent in the cost of in-house counsel. 
125 See Appendix A, at A.4 (53% of general counsel respondents indicate that such 
knowledge could make outside counsel a lower-cost provider of legal services). This 
highlights the importance of law firm internal educational programs. 
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lawyers offer more of an advantage here for clients with small in-house legal 
departments.126 The findings also confirm the value of hiring outside counsel to help 
smooth out fluctuating transactional workloads that, if addressed by hiring in-house 
counsel, would result in future excess capacity.127 Finally, outside lawyers sometimes 
have an artificial cost advantage where a third party pays their client’s legal fees, because 
it is more common for outside lawyer than in-house lawyer fees to be paid.128 
 
 Reducing-Agency-Costs Hypothesis Compared with Empirical Findings.  The first 
type of agency costs, constraining management, is generally viewed as relatively 
unimportant.129 Although the ability to observe and report management misbehavior does 
not generally factor into the decision to hire counsel, there is a consensus that in-house 
                                                 
126 Sixty-eight percent of general counsel respondents from one-to-two lawyer in-house 
legal departments believe that outside counsel have a more extensive knowledge of 
transactional law, compared to 53% of respondents from three-to-nine lawyer in-house 
departments and only 21% of respondents from in-house departments of ten or more 
lawyers. Appendix B, at A.4. Cf. e-mail from Gabe Shawn Varges, supra note 10 
(observing that outside law firms are also more likely to have “a broader supply of 
templates and other pre-fabricated components to apply than in-house, particularly 
smaller, in-house legal departments,” and that “smaller [legal] departments sometimes 
seek to overcome this through use of external professional associations, like the 
American Corporate Counsel Association that offers a library of templates, precedents, 
etc.”).  
127 Appendix A, at A.4 (41% of general counsel respondents indicate that smoothing out 
fluctuating transactional workloads could make outside counsel a lower-cost provider of 
legal services). Interestingly, this was by far the dominant factor that outside lawyer 
respondents saw as explaining why outside counsel may be lower-cost providers of legal 
services. See id. (93% of outside lawyer respondents so indicating). 
128 Appendix A, at A.4 (27% of general counsel respondents indicate this factor as a 
reason why outside counsel may be lower-cost providers of legal services). See also 
Appendix A, at C.7 (80% of general counsel respondents indicate it is unlikely that third 
parties will pay for in-house lawyer imputed fees). This may result in a “moral hazard” 
problem insofar as otherwise more expensive outside lawyers sometimes may be hired 
only because the other side to a transaction will reimburse for outside lawyer fees. 
129 Fifty-two percent of general counsel respondents reported that the ability to observe 
management misbehavior is either a small factor or not a factor at all in selecting counsel. 
Appendix A, at B.2. 
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counsel are better able to observe such misbehavior.130 Survey respondents disagree, 
however, about who is more likely to report misbehavior.131 
 
 In theory, the second type of agency cost, potentially resulting from the conflict 
between a company and its outside law firm, can be mitigated through monitoring and 
convergence. The findings indeed confirm that in-house counsel closely monitor in-house 
counsel,132 paying attention to progress of the transaction, billing, and client protection.133 
Convergence, in contrast, appears to be only partially effective in reducing these agency 
costs.134 
 
 Economies-of-Scale Hypothesis Compared with Empirical Findings.  The 
findings confirm that at least part of the shift to in-house lawyering is attributable to the 
standardization of many transactions, which enables in-house counsel to more cost-
effectively perform the legal work.135 The findings also confirm that at least some of this 
                                                 
130 Thus, 93% of general counsel respondents and 64% of outside lawyer respondents 
believe that in-house counsel are better able to observe management misbehavior. 
Appendix A, at B.2. One respondent to question B.2 of the Company’s General Counsel 
Questionnaire made the following analogy: “Who can more quickly and accurately 
identify a family member’s drug problem? The priest who visits twice a year, or the older 
brother who shares a bedroom? As long as the in-house lawyer doesn’t have his own 
‘drug problem’ I believe he or she will always have a better observation point than an 
outside lawyer.” 
131 Appendix A, at B.4 (89% of general counsel respondents indicate that in-house 
lawyers are more likely to report management misbehavior, whereas 64% of outside 
lawyer respondents say they are more likely to report it). 
132 Appendix A, at B.6 (50% of general counsel respondents indicate that they monitor 
outside counsel to a “great extent,” and another 39% indicate that they monitor such 
counsel to a “significant extent”).  
133 Appendix A, at B.7 (97% of general counsel respondents indicate that they monitor 
progress of the transaction, 86% indicate that they monitor billing, and 81% indicate that 
they monitor client protection).   
134 Appendix A, at B.8 (only 16% of general counsel respondents indicate that 
convergence (at least) significantly reduces the need for in-house monitoring of outside 
counsel, whereas 39% indicate that convergence impacts the need for such monitoring to 
a small extent or not at all).  
135 Twenty-four of thirty-nine respondents to question H.4 of the Company’s General 
Counsel Questionnaire agree that increased costs of outside counsel and increased 
standardization of transactions have facilitated a shift to in-house lawyering. 
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cost-effectiveness results from logistical economies of scale in the form of in-house 
counsel’s ability to use technology to routinize in-house transactional work.136   
 
 The findings additionally confirm the utility of hiring outside counsel to help 
smooth out fluctuating workloads.137 The shift to in-house lawyering would be even 
greater but for difficulty in matching the fluctuating volume of work with the number of 
in-house lawyers.138 Furthermore, outside lawyers can help to maximize economies of 
scale where companies have difficulty in matching complex or unusual transactions with 
in-house lawyer expertise.139 
 
 The findings support the view that where companies do not engage in repeat 
transactions of a given type, economies of scale may favor outside counsel who engage in 
multiple transactions of that type, especially where the transactions are complex. In 
deciding whether to hire outside counsel, 93% of general counsel respondents consider 
complexity of the transaction and 59% regard it as the most important factor.140 This 
suggests that outside lawyers, to remain competitive, should concentrate their practices in 
the most complex forms of transactional work. It also may help to explain the dramatic 
growth of in-house legal departments: most of a company’s transactions may not be very 
complex. 
 
 Interestingly, although one would predict that companies that expand in size may 
gain economies of scale by hiring relatively more full-time in-house counsel with a 
                                                 
136 One respondent to question H.5 of the Company’s General Counsel Questionnaire 
observed, for example, that “technology has made it easier for in-house lawyers to do 
repetitive agreements as they can search earlier documents and memos to refresh their 
memory on a less frequent issue to determine how it was treated in the past.” 
137 Cf. supra note 62-63 and accompanying text (discussing why this might be important). 
138 Appendix A, at H.2 (32% of general counsel respondents reporting this difficulty in 
matching).  
139 Appendix A, at H.2. 
140 Appendix A, at A.1 & A.2. Outside lawyers appear to recognize the importance of 
complexity to the hiring decision. See id. at A.1 & A.2 (100% of outside lawyer 
respondents citing complexity as a relevant factor, and 64% of such respondents citing 
complexity as the most important factor, in the hiring decision).  
 In-House Lawyering.doc 
28
greater range of expertise, the findings suggest that most companies, irrespective of size, 
have approximately the same proportion of transactions lawyered in-house.141 [Can this 
result be explained by offsetting factors?] 
 
 On the other hand, the findings reveal that particular costs and benefits of using 
in-house or outside counsel can vary significantly as a function of legal department size. 
For example, the benefits of outside lawyer knowledge and of outside lawyer support 
staff are inversely proportional to the size of the in-house legal department.142 Monitoring 
of outside lawyer work is directly proportional to size of the in-house legal department.143 
The degree of a company’s outside lawyer convergence also is directly proportional to 
size of the in-house legal department (in that the bigger the legal department, the greater 
the convergence),144 perhaps reflecting that larger legal departments either have less need 
to rely on outside law firms or are large because management has already decided to 
reduce reliance on outside law firms.145 
 
 Economies-of-Scope Hypothesis Compared with Empirical Findings.  The 
findings confirm that in-house counsel, by avoiding the learning curve of having to be 
educated about the client’s regulation and its organizational and operational structure, 
                                                 
141 When the survey data for each are examined in the aggregate (and assuming that 
company size correlates closely with legal department size), it appears that large, medium 
and small in-house legal departments handle approximately the same proportion of 
company transactions in house. See Appendix B, at H.1 (reporting that companies with 
one or two in-house lawyers handle 66% on average of transactions in-house, companies 
with three to nine in-house lawyers handle 70% on average of transactions in-house, and 
companies with ten or more in-house lawyers handle 70% on average of transactions in-
house). Although regression analysis shows a slight positive correlation between the size 
of in-house legal departments and the percentage of transactions handled in-house, the 
correlation is limited and inconclusive. 
142 Appendix B, at A.4 & A.7. 
143 Appendix B, at B.6. 
144 Appendix B, at D.9 (larger in-house legal departments are more likely to have already 
reduced the number of outside law firms with which the company works). 
145 If the latter is true, one should expect average law department size to grow as 
companies become less reliant on outside law firms. 
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have an advantage over outside counsel.146 The findings only partly support the view that 
learning curves can be improved through convergence of outside law firms, creating 
more incentive for outside firms to develop in-firm expertise about their clients.147 
Although most respondents believe that convergence would reduce learning curves to 
some degree, few believe that reduction would be significant.148 Perhaps for this reason, 
there appears to be no clear trend toward convergence.149 
 
 The findings suggest, but do not prove, that outside law firms can achieve 
economies of scope by offering clients a range of legal expertise.150 
 
 Responsiveness-and-Ease-of-Communications Hypothesis Compared with 
Empirical Findings.  The findings confirm that in-house counsel communicate better with 
management.151 Some general counsel respondents even see in-house counsel as more of 
                                                 
146 Appendix A, at A.6 (all general counsel respondents report that in-house lawyers’ 
familiarity with the company, and 83% of general counsel respondents report that 
understanding of the company’s culture, explain why in-house counsel provide greater 
benefits). See also Appendix A, at A.3 (85% of general counsel respondents citing 
avoiding the learning curve as a factor helping to explain the cost differential between in-
house and outside counsel). 
147 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
148 See Appendix A at D.8 (92% of general counsel respondents believe that reducing the 
number of outside law firms would achieve some degree of parity in in-house and outside 
lawyer familiarity with client’s regulatory, organizational and operational issues, 
although only 3.4% believed that parity could be achieved to any great extent). See also 
id. at D.9 (56% of general counsel respondents report already reducing the number of 
outside law firms used for transactional work). 
149 Liggio, supra note 63, at 632 (observing that “[t]here is considerably more spreading 
of the work among [law] firms and the use of boutique shops for specialized projects”). 
150 Cf. Appendix A, at A.4 (64% of outside lawyer respondents indicate that outside 
counsel may be a lower cost provider because they have a more extensive knowledge of 
transactional law); id. at A.7 (79% of outside lawyer respondents, many of whom 
specifically cite their firms’ specialty practices, believe that outside law firms may 
provide greater benefits through access to more and/or better resources). 
151 Appendix A, at E.2 (68% of general counsel respondents indicate that in-house 
counsel are better able to communicate with company management, whereas only 27% of 
general counsel respondents and half of outside lawyer respondents believe that in-house 
and outside counsel are equally able to communicate with company management). 
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an ally and team member than outside counsel.152 In rare cases, however, closeness 
between in-house counsel and management could become a liability where it deters such 
counsel from exercising proper independence or from reporting management 
misbehavior.153 
 
 Timely availability and responsiveness appear to be important to the lawyer hiring 
decision.154 A majority of general counsel respondents perceive in-house lawyers to be 
marginally more responsive to the client than outside lawyers.155 Although a significant 
minority of those respondents believe that in-house and outside lawyers are equally 
responsive,156 few regard outside lawyers as more responsive.157 This is in marked 
contrast to the views of outside lawyers, who generally regard themselves as more 
responsive to the client than in-house counsel.158  
 
                                                 
152 Thus, one respondent to question H.4 of the Company’s General Counsel 
Questionnaire observed that “businesses are seeing in-house legal as more of an ally and 
engaging in-house legal as part of the ‘normal term’ on more transactions.” Another 
emphasized “the ability of in-house lawyers to become an integral part of the transaction 
team [who will have to] live with their deal for as long as they are with the same 
company.” 
153 E-mail from Gabe Shawn Varges, supra note 10. 
154 Cf. Appendix A, at A.6 (58% of general counsel respondents identify timely 
availability and responsiveness as reasons why in-house lawyers may provide greater 
benefits than outside lawyers). Only 16% of general counsel respondents identify those 
reasons as explaining why outside lawyers may provide greater benefits (see Appendix 
A, at A.7), but in-house counsel make the hiring decision. 
155 Appendix A, at E.1 (52% of general counsel respondents believe that in-house lawyers 
are more responsive). 
156 See id. (43% of general counsel respondents stating that in-house and outside lawyers 
are equally responsive). 
157 Id. (only 5% of general counsel respondents regard outside lawyers as more 
responsive). 
158 Appendix A, at A.7 (64% of outside lawyer respondents identifying timely availability 
and responsiveness as reasons why they may provide greater benefits than in-house 
counsel). See also id. at E.1 (43% of outside lawyer respondents believe they are more 
responsive, whereas no such respondents believe that in-house counsel are more 
responsive, to companies’ timing requirements). 
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 To some extent, the very location of in-house counsel—typically at corporate 
headquarters,159 where they have regular formal or informal contact with senior 
management160—may explain why in-house counsel are, or at least appear to be, more 
responsive to the client.161 Furthermore, that proximity makes it easier for management to 
consult in-house counsel at early stages of transactions, making in-house counsel appear 
even more beneficial.162  
 
 Reputational-Intermediary Hypothesis Compared with Empirical Findings.  The 
findings suggest that outside counsel no longer add greatly to reputational value in 
transactions,163 and that outside counsel add even less value for companies with large in-
house legal departments.164 Reputation reflects quality, and most general counsel 
respondents view in-house lawyers as performing as high quality work as outside 
lawyers.165 A majority of outside lawyer respondents agree that they are no more 
qualified than in-house counsel.166 And, to the extent outside counsel might be more 
                                                 
159 See Appendix A, at E.3 (96% of general counsel respondents reporting that they are 
located in the corporate headquarters). 
160 See id. (96% of general counsel respondents reporting that they have regular (formal 
or informal) contact with senior management). 
161 Regular formal or informal contact also can foster trust between senior management 
and in-house counsel, which itself can make in-house counsel appear more responsive. 
Cf. e-mail from Gabe Shawn Varges, supra note 10 (observing that regular contact 
increases trust between senior management and in-house counsel). 
162 See Appendix A, at A.6 (90% of general counsel respondents and 57% of outside 
lawyer respondents reporting that in-house lawyer involvement at a much earlier stage in 
transactions than outside law firms helps to explain why in-house lawyers may provide 
greater benefits than outside lawyers).  
163 Appendix A, at F.1 (64% of general counsel respondents believe that outside counsel 
enhance reputational value to some extent but only 5% believe it enhances such value to 
a great extent). These findings confirm a “tentative assertion” made in 1995 that 
reputational “value in law practice is, except for the very few ‘super elite’ firms, on the 
decline.” Okamoto, supra note 93, at 43-44.   
164 Appendix B, at F.1. 
165 See Appendix A, at A.7 (only 7% of general counsel respondents believe that lawyers 
at outside firms perform higher quality work). Cf. id. at F.2 (only 15% of general counsel 
respondents believe that outside counsel are more qualified than in-house counsel). 
166 Appendix A, at F.2 (57% of outside lawyer respondents so agreeing). Incongruously, 
though, outside lawyer respondents tended to view themselves, on average, as more 
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qualified for a type of transactional work, both general counsel respondents and outside 
lawyer respondents agree it would be because outside counsel see that type of work more 
often.167 Still, most respondents concede that reputation still favors outside counsel 
because reputational perceptions change slowly.168 
 
 This disconnect between quality and reputation helps explain a result that may be 
surprising to many outside lawyers. Only 32% of general counsel respondents take into 
account the need for quality work in deciding whether or not to hire outside counsel.169 In 
contrast, 64% of outside lawyer respondents believe the need for quality work is a 
relevant factor in the hiring decision.170  
 
 The findings also suggest why, other things being equal, outside counsel might be 
no more qualified than in-house counsel. Most general counsel respondents report that 
their companies are able to compete at least to some extent with outside law firms in 
hiring lawyers to work as in-house counsel.171 Although these respondents universally 
                                                                                                                                                 
qualified than in-house counsel—perhaps the “Lake Wobegon” effect. Appendix A, at 
F.2 (57% of outside lawyer respondents so viewing themselves). 
167 Appendix A, at F.3 (76% of general counsel respondents, and 93% of outside lawyer 
respondents, agreeing that outside counsel might, on average, be more qualified for 
transactional work because they see the type of transaction more often). Few survey 
respondents (only 2% of general counsel and 7% of outside lawyers) felt that outside 
lawyers might be more qualified because of higher intellect or better legal education. Id. 
168 Appendix A, at F.2 (61% of general counsel respondents, and 57% of outside lawyer 
respondents, believe that outside counsel are no more qualified than in-house counsel but 
reputational perceptions change slowly). 
169 Appendix A, at A.1. 
170 Appendix A, at A.1. But cf. id. at A.2 (indicating that no outside lawyer respondents 
regarded the need for quality work as the most important factor). 
171 Appendix A, at F.4 (81% of general counsel respondents so reporting). 
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believe their companies cannot compete based on monetary compensation,172 they report 
that they are able to compete based on the better lifestyle of in-house lawyers.173  
 
 This suggests that if the lifestyle of in-house lawyers were to deteriorate, the 
quality of in-house lawyers might diminish. It also suggests that outside law firms could 
attempt to compete more effectively by increasing the quality of life of their legal 
personnel.174 In the latter context, outside lawyer respondents report that their ability to 
compete with in-house legal departments in hiring the best lawyers is dependent on 
paying higher monetary compensation, engaging in more interesting and diverse 
transactions, and having greater prestige associated with their law firms.175 The 
competition will become tougher, however, if in-house counsel salaries begin to rival 
outside counsel incomes, the range of outside lawyer transactions (or at least the range of 
such transactions worked on by any given lawyer) narrows, or the reputational gap 
between outside and in-house counsel continues to shrink. 
 
 Finally, the findings confirm the existence of a significant reputational gap 
between in-house and outside counsel in giving third-party legal opinions.176 Fifty-nine 
percent of general counsel respondents report that a third party requesting a legal opinion 
on matters other than corporate housekeeping will accept an in-house opinion only 
                                                 
172 Appendix A, at F.5. Although senior in-house counsel sometimes may receive stock 
options which would add to the compensation package, only one general counsel 
respondent even mentioned stock options as a possible form of compensation for in-
house transactional lawyers. Also, recent accounting changes concerning disclosure of 
stock options as a cost suggest that stock options will be used even less in the future as a 
form of corporate compensation. [cite] 
173 Appendix A, at F.5 (54% of general counsel respondents citing a low-stress, better 
lifestyle as a competitive advantage over outside law firms). Fourteen percent of general 
counsel respondents also cited the more flexible hours available to in-house lawyers. Id.  
174 [Consider discussing my recent observations of Quinn Emmanuel’s attempt to do 
this.] 
175 Appendix A, at F.5 (71%, 86%, and 50%, respectively, of outside lawyer respondents 
so agreeing). 
176 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. 
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occasionally or rarely.177 Nonetheless, only 21% of general counsel respondents hire 
outside lawyers to any significant extent simply because third parties request outside 
legal opinions.178 The disparity between these numbers might be explained by the fact 
that legal opinions are not always required on matters whose analysis would be 
independent of the transaction’s fact pattern.179 Thus, in at least some transactions where 
non-housekeeping legal opinions are required, outside counsel already may be involved 
because of the complexity or novelty of the fact pattern or issues.180  
 
 The findings may not be precise enough, however, to measure the reputational 
gap between in-house counsel and the very finest of outside law firms. At least one recent 
study suggests, for example, that a significant reputational gap may still exist between in-
house counsel and the nation’s few dozen most prestigious firms.181 That study discovers 
that those law firms are maintaining single-tiered equity partnerships, whereas less 
prestigious law firms are switching to two-tiered partnerships consisting of both equity 
partners and lower paid non-equity partners.182 This article suggests an explanation for 
this dichotomy: the most prestigious law firms are performing work that is especially 
complex or novel, whereas lower prestige firms may be competing with in-house lawyers 
                                                 
177 Appendix A, at F.7. Cf. e-mail from Gabe Shawn Varges, supra note 10 (suggesting 
that “the comparative advantage of [outside] law firms lies primarily in” their issuance of 
legal opinions). 
178 Appendix A, at F.6. 
179 See Schwarcz, supra note 91, at 11 n. 53. 
180 See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text. 
181 Henderson, supra note 119. Compare note 163, supra (predicting in 1995 that 
reputational value in law practice is, “except for the very few ‘super elite’ [law] firms,” 
on the decline).  
182 Henderson, supra note 119, at 1695, 1725-26, 1730 (finding that, according to data 
published in THE AMERICAN LAWYER, only 42 of the top 200 largest (based on gross 
revenue) American law firms still maintain a single-tier equity partnership structure; and 
also finding that, according to proxies for prestige derived from the Vault 100 prestige 
score and the 2004 Mid-Level Survey, the law firms that switched to two-tier 
partnerships are “less prestigious than the firms that remained single-tier”).      
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for much of the same work and so must lower billing rates by employing non-equity 
partners.183 
 
 Client-Privilege-and-Confidentiality Hypothesis Compared with Empirical 
Findings.  General counsel respondents view the attorney-client privilege as weaker for 
in-house than for outside lawyers.184 As a result, half of such respondents would at least 
consider hiring (and presumably in the past sometimes may have hired) outside counsel 
solely to take advantage of this privilege.185 To the extent outside lawyers have been 
hired for this reason, future hiring of outside counsel may diminish to the extent 
differences narrow—and may increase to the extent differences expand—between this 
privilege for in-house and outside counsel.186 
 
 Dynamic-Equilibrium Hypothesis Compared with Empirical Findings.  The 
findings suggest that the radical shift of the past few decades to in-house lawyering may 
be slowing or approaching an equilibrium state. Although many general counsel 
respondents would like to shift additional work in-house, they face institutional realities 
of staffing.187 Furthermore, even as the quality of in-house transactional work approaches 
or matches that provided by outside lawyers, lingering concerns about reputational 
                                                 
183 Cf. Henderson, supra note 119, at 1749 (concluding that at least one explanation for 
his findings is that “a highly prestigious [law] firm enjoys high client demand for high-
end noncommodity legal services”). 
184 Appendix A, at G.2 (59% responding the privilege is somewhat weaker for in-house 
counsel and another 16% responding it is much weaker). 
185 Id. at G.3. 
186 But cf. Schwarcz, supra note 11 (finding it doubtful that transactional lawyers add net 
overall value through privilege and confidentiality). 
187 See supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text. See also Appendix A, at H.2 (32% 
of general counsel respondents cite difficulty in matching the number of in-house lawyers 
with fluctuating workload, and 30% cite an inability to find the in-house expertise 
necessary for complex or unusual transaction, as reasons why the percentage of company 
business transactions currently lawyered in-house is less than  what those respondents 
would prefer to have lawyered in-house). 
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advantages of law firms may prevent companies from effectively and efficiently 
transitioning work to in-house lawyers.188  
 
 Indeed, the equilibrium might even reverse if in-house lawyering becomes a less 
attractive profession or if in-house costs increase. The former could occur if in-house 
lawyers stop receiving the quality-of-life benefits that have been attracting them to 
relatively low paying jobs.189 The latter could occur if in-house salaries rise, a real 
possibility insofar as those salaries may still be artificially low because of a path 
dependence. The argument for this path dependence is that, at least in the latter half of the 
twentieth century,190 the best law graduates—who could command the highest incomes—
desired to work at firms.191 This desire resulted from various factors, including that firms 
offered more prestige and possibly professional independence than in-house work.192 
Companies were able to hire only second-rate applicants, reinforcing the low prestige of 
in-house legal jobs. The increasing prestige of in-house jobs, however, has been 
attracting more qualified applicants, who in turn are demanding higher salaries.193  
 
 COMPARING THE FINDINGS WITH ECONOMIC THEORY 
 This article does not claim that these findings are conclusive. As discussed, the 
use of survey methodology has both inherent limitations and, in this article’s context, 
                                                 
188 Cf. Appendix A, at F.2 (65% of general counsel respondents believe that outside 
lawyers may be no more qualified than in-house lawyers, but reputational perceptions 
change slowly). 
189 See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.  
190 Cf. Liggio, supra note 63, at 621 (observing that the “golden age” of in-house counsel 
“lasted from the early part of the 20th century through the late 1930s”). 
191 [cite] 
192 Cf. Liggio, supra note 63, at 622 (observing that “[d]uring the 1960s and 1970s [in-
house] corporate counsel were looked on with disdain by the outside bar. The corporate 
counsel role was deemed a parking place for those associates who couldn’t make 
partner.”).  
193 Liggio, supra note 63, at 627-28 (observing that “in the early 1980s[,] [t]he 
compensation of in-house lawyers was going up. The pay of inside counsel was not only 
catching up with outside lawyers but outside metropolitan areas the inside pay was better 
than what associates and partners were earning in law firms.”). 
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other specific limitations.194 The findings therefore may be biased or otherwise flawed. 
To help test for bias or flaws, this part compares the findings with the predictions of 
economic theory. Significant differences might raise questions as to the reliability of the 
findings. 
 
 A decision whether to bring legal work in-house is a subset of the broader 
question of vertical integration: whether a company should make needed products in-
house, or whether it should buy them.195 Applied to legal services, this “make-or-buy 
decision” would be similarly couched: When should a company “make” an in-house legal 
staff to provide legal services, and when should it buy those services from outside 
lawyers?196  
 
 Professor Ronald Coase laid the groundwork for examining vertical integration, 
asking, “Why does the entrepreneur not organize one less transaction or one more?”197 
Following Coase, economists have fashioned a systematic theoretical framework for this 
                                                 
194 See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. 
195 Cf. Regan, supra note 40, at 27-28 (suggesting that legal services can be viewed “as a 
factor of production whose efficiency might be enhanced through vertical integration”). 
196 This assumes those legal services are adequate substitutes (although the hypotheses 
and empirical findings go beyond this by examining why those services may not be 
adequate substitutes). Also, although “the literature on vertical integration tends to focus 
on a simple dichotomy between the decision to ‘make’ internally or ‘buy’ through the 
market, . . . there are a wide array of market-based governance arrangements that 
represent alternatives to both simple anonymous repeated spot market transactions and 
vertical integration.” Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration, in HANDBOOK OF NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 319, 320 (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley, eds., 2005). 
Thus, in-house and outside lawyers sometimes act in concert together, such as where a 
company hires outside counsel to assist or complement in-house counsel’s work on a 
transaction (e.g., a merger transaction where in-house counsel perform due diligence and 
outside counsel draft and negotiate deal documents). See e-mail from Gabe Shawn 
Varges, supra note 10. Companies also could “rent” attorneys from law firms, or law 
firms could lend attorneys to clients for periods of time. This article, like the literature on 
vertical integration, focuses on the simple (and essential) dichotomy and not on possible 
alternatives. See also SMITH, supra note 4, at 224-25 (discussing how GE in-house 
lawyers are working with outside counsel in specialty areas, thereby adding value by 
closely pairing in-house expertise and outside expertise). 
197 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 
393-94 (1937). 
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examination. Sometimes referred to as transaction cost economics, or “TCE,” the 
framework builds on the insight that “all complex contracts are unavoidably 
incomplete.”198 Thus, companies are unable to contractually bind third parties to all 
circumstances,199 and circumstances may arise where one or more parties may engage in 
ex post opportunistic or otherwise conflicting behavior.200 Internalizing the work can 
minimize the conflicts201 because a company’s managers “(arguably) will pursue a 
common objective to maximize the [company’s] value” and “are not expected to engage 
in the kinds of opportunistic behavior” engaged in by third parties.202 
 
 In a labor context—the context of this article203—a potential for conflicts arises 
out of human “asset specificity,” that workers accumulate relationship-specific 
information and expertise that make them efficient in the particular relationship but that 
would lose value in other relationships.204 This creates a bilateral dependency: “workers 
who acquire firm-specific skills will lose value if prematurely terminated (and firms will 
incur added training costs if such employees quit).”205 This dependency invites a 
“governance” response.206 “Because continuity has value to both firm and worker, 
governance features that deter termination (severance pay) and quits (nonvested benefits) 
                                                 
198 Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in HANDBOOK OF NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 41, 46 (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley, eds., 2005) 
(emphasis in original). 
199 Contracts may be incomplete for various reasons, including the difficulty of trying to 
anticipate all possible contingencies (“bounded rationality”), the costs of trying to address 
such contingencies, and the costs of monitoring, verification, and enforcement (e.g., 
litigation costs, delays, and uncertainties). Joskow, supra note 196, at 322. Attempting to 
draft for all possible contingencies can backfire by introducing “costly rigidities and . . . 
poor adaptive properties.” Id. at 332. 
200 Joskow, supra note 196, at 321 & 326. This is sometimes referred to as the “hold up” 
problem. Id. at 322. 
201 Id. at 321. 
202 Id. at 333. 
203 Hiring lawyers is, of course, hiring labor, albeit highly skilled labor. 
204 Joskow, supra note 196, at 328 (giving the example of design engineers who develop 
special skills designing a particular company-specific product). 
205 Williamson, supra note 198, at 55. 
206 The TCE literature often refers to vertical integration as an alternative “governance” 
response to outside contracting. Joskow, supra note 196, at 333. 
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and which address and settle disputes in an orderly way (grievance systems) to which the 
parties ascribe confidence have a lot to recommend them.”207 
 
 Bilateral dependency can help to explain a rapid rise in in-house lawyering. 
Several decades ago, for example, no  truly “deep” market for in-house counsel 
existed.208 Lawyers who went in-house and acquired in-house-specific skills therefore 
could lose value if prematurely terminated. By the same token, the companies for which 
they worked would incur added training costs if those lawyers quit. Companies therefore 
provided incentives, such as quality-of-life benefits and perhaps certain measures of job 
protection, to deter in-house lawyers from quitting.209 That, in turn, attracted more 
lawyers to work in-house, deepening the market and potentially creating a feedback loop: 
the deeper the market, the more lawyers would want to work in-house (since, if 
prematurely terminated, they could more easily find other jobs), in turn creating an even 
deeper market, etc.  
 
 Economic theory also may help to explain why the radical shift of the past few 
decades to in-house lawyering may be slowing or approaching an equilibrium state. 
Except for situations where there are “significant market imperfections” justifying 
vertical integration, “market mediation is generally to be preferred over internal 
supply.”210 Indeed, Professor Joskow maintains that “[v]irtually all theories of vertical 
integration turn in one way or another on the presence of market imperfections of some 
type.”211 In the context of transactional lawyering, what might those imperfections be?  
 
 The central imperfection identified by TCE theory is ex post opportunistic 
behavior—meaning, in this article’s context, that outside counsel may try to take 
                                                 
207 Williamson, supra note 198, at 55. 
208 [cite] 
209 [cite. Is there any support for the job protection supposition?] 
210 Joskow, supra note 196, at 320 (quoting Oliver Williamson, The Vertical Integration 
of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 113 (1971)). 
211 Joskow, supra note 196, at 320. 
 In-House Lawyering.doc 
40
advantage of the client after being retained but before the transaction closes.212 It is 
unlikely, however, that outside counsel would be motivated to behave opportunistically 
where—as is typically the case—multiple other law firms with the necessary 
transactional capabilities are available for hire.213 A law firm that engages in such 
behavior would probably be replaced, and may well suffer reputational cost.214  
 
 Other previously discussed market imperfections of using outside counsel do, 
however, appear to justify a degree of vertical integration. These primarily consist of the 
information asymmetry by which outside counsel do not understand the company as well 
as in-house counsel and therefore have a higher learning curve215; of agency costs insofar 
as outside counsel are less likely to be loyal to the company from the standpoint of billing 
and fees, and also insofar as outside counsel are less able than in-house counsel to 
monitor and report on management misbehavior216; and of outside counsel’s lower 
availability and less timely responsiveness than in-house counsel.217 Some vertical 
integration also appears to be justified by the profit charged by outside counsel, although 
charging a profit is not technically a market imperfection.218  
 
 The existence of market imperfections does not, however, militate for complete 
vertical integration. This article has shown, for example, that most of the agency costs 
                                                 
212 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
213 See, e.g., Sandra Prufer, In-House Counsel Axing Law Firms, ABA JOURNAL REP. 2 
(Sept. 8, 2006) (based on a survey discussed therein, observing that “[f]or those [law] 
firms that don’t rise to the challenge, the number of secondary law firms waiting to 
capture the lost business is only growing”). 
214 Cf. Joskow, supra note 196, at 333 (noting that “the presence of reputational capital 
and the potential erosion of its value by opportunistic behavior may operate to mitigate 
such behavior”). Individual lawyers engaging in opportunistic behavior could also 
jeopardize their jobs with the law firm and, where such behavior is unethical, could even 
lose their licenses to practice law.  
215 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
216 See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text. 
217 See supra notes 151-162 and accompanying text. 
218 See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text. TCE theory does not appear to 
regard profits charged by outside market suppliers of goods or services as market 
imperfections. 
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can be mitigated through monitoring and convergence219 and that there may well be 
uncertainty whether outside counsel are in fact less responsive than in-house counsel.220 
Furthermore, vertical integration itself creates costs that must be balanced against the 
imperfections.221 In that context, although TCE theory talks almost entirely of “costs,” its 
application implicitly (and sensibly) takes benefits into account in the balance.222 
Balancing of costs and benefits, however, has been precisely this article’s approach, 
revealing that outside counsel sometimes can add more value than in-house counsel.223 
 
 Economic theory also helps to explain why relatively few companies rely 
exclusively on in-house legal staff. A company engaging in such exclusivity “is likely to 
lose some of the benefits associated with continually examining and accessing outside 
opportunities through repeated contracting.”224 For example, a company using only in-
house counsel may be unable to keep up with developments as well as a company that 
uses at least some outside lawyers.225 Also, in-house legal staff “may have strong 
incentives to hide or misrepresent outside [counsel] opportunities in order to protect itself 
from external competition.”226 Dual sourcing, or using outside counsel for at least a 
portion of a company’s legal work, can help mitigate these costs.227   
 
                                                 
219 See supra notes 132-134 and accompanying text. 
220 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
221 Joskow, supra note 196, at 325 & 334. 
222 Cf. id. at 337 (“The bottom line is that there are benefits and costs of internal 
organization.”). 
223 See, e.g., supra note 139 and accompanying text (indicating that outside lawyers can 
help to maximize economies of scale where companies have difficulty in matching 
complex or unusual transactions with in-house lawyer expertise).  
224 Joskow, supra note 196, at 325 & 336. 
225 Cf. e-mail from Gabe Shawn Varges, supra note 10 (observing that “by doing work 
for several clients, the outside lawyer brings . . . more advance market-based knowledge” 
than in-house counsel could gather).  
226 Joskow, supra note 196, at 325 & 336. Cf. id. at 325 (suggesting that in-house 
counsel, like any other employees, may be less willing to reveal information that 
“adversely affects their promotion possibilities or continuing employment”). 
227 Id. at 325 & 336. 
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 Finally, economic theory helps to explain why there is a “dynamic” equilibrium. 
Besides the feedback-loop insight already discussed,228 economists observe that changes 
such as “[c]hanges in technology or government regulations may . . . change the relative 
attractiveness of” vertical integration.229 This is very much in line with the view that the 
advent of the Internet worked as a catalyst for the shift to in-house lawyering.230 The 
regulatory explosion of the 1960s and 1970s also may have created, decades later when 
the transactional legal work matured and become more straightforward and as companies 
grew large enough to engage in repetitive transactions, a critical mass of straightforward, 
repetitive transactions which in-house counsel could perform at minimal cost.231 In turn, 
using in-house counsel to perform that work would have helped to break down 
information asymmetries between clients and outside counsel regarding the expertise 
needed to perform transactional work, enabling companies to better assess when outside 
lawyers can—and when they cannot—add more value than in-house lawyers.232 
                                                 
228 See supra note 209 and following text. 
229 Joskow, supra note 196, at 337. See also id. at 345 (observing that “the ‘make or buy’ 
decision is not a once and for all decision. Firms may choose to vertically integrate and 
then decide that it is less costly to rely on market contracting.”). 
230 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. See also infra note 234 (discussing 
outsourcing of legal work to foreign law providers, a recent development driven by the 
spread of high-speed Internet communications).  
231 This is consistent with the plurality view of respondents (though some strongly 
disagree) to question H.4 of the Company’s General Counsel Questionnaire. Cf. Regan, 
supra note 40, at 27-28 (arguing that at least one factor that explains why companies only 
recently began shifting legal work in-house is that “[c]ompared to other steps in the 
production process, law was less amenable to standardization according to routine 
procedures. This meant that monitoring costs were higher than those required for 
supervision of many other aspects of production.”). Although Professor Regan advances 
several additional factors to help explain why vertical integration of legal services has 
been so late in coming, those factors do not persuasively help to explain why the shift is 
occurring now. See id. (arguing, as additional factors, that “many companies had strong 
ties to particular localities and relied on lawyers who practiced in and were familiar with 
the [geographical] areas in which they operated,” and that because some legal services 
“drew on attorneys’ legal and business contacts and their reputations,” “[l]awyers who 
practiced in separate firms for more than one client had the potential to provide 
corporations with important access to a broad segment of the business, political and legal 
community”). 
232 Cf. Regan, supra note 40, at 30 (arguing that in-house lawyers “can serve as 
sophisticated consumers of outside legal services, reducing the asymmetry of information 
between the corporation and law firm attorneys. In-house counsel closely monitor the 
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 Economic theory therefore supplements and helps to confirm and place this 
article’s empirical findings into perspective.  
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 Various factors have contributed to the in-house lawyering transformation of the 
past few decades. The shift may initially have been triggered by changes in technology, 
such as the advent of computers and the Internet, creating logistical economies of scale 
by helping to routinize in-house legal work and by providing substitutes for law firm 
libraries. A portion of this shift also may have been triggered by disintermediation, the 
recognition that companies can avoid the profit component charged for outside legal 
services by bringing lawyers in-house. 
 
 Once begun, this transformation may have been accelerated through a feedback 
loop. At a time of relatively few in-house counsel, lawyers working in-house had a 
limited market for their skills, so the best lawyers tended to work at outside law firms. As 
more lawyers came in-house, however, their employers provided incentives—such as 
better quality of life and working conditions—to attract and keep the best of them, 
thereby minimizing training and replacement costs. Those incentives attracted even 
higher quality lawyers to in-house work, which in turn motivated companies to provide 
even greater incentives and expanded the market for in-house lawyer skills.233 
 
 The result is that, at present, companies generally regard in-house and outside 
lawyers as providing roughly the same quality of work. Companies also regard in-house 
lawyers to be slightly more responsive than outside lawyers. Furthermore, with large and 
sophisticated in-house legal staffs, companies are now better able to cut through the 
                                                                                                                                                 
provision of these services, with lower switching costs giving them leverage in 
determining both how work is done and how much the company will pay for it.”). 
233 There also may be a supply-side explanation for at least part of the transformation: as 
the number of law graduates skyrocketed in the past few decades, law firms and in-house  
law departments have grown, and the latter are now large enough to perform 
transactional legal work. 
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information asymmetries that previously existed between clients and outside counsel 
regarding the expertise needed to perform transactions, enabling companies to better 
assess when outside lawyers are worth hiring. 
 
 The transformation to in-house lawyering may well continue for some time, but 
outside law firms are assured of at least some future niche. They always will be needed to 
help smooth out fluctuating transactional workloads that, if addressed by hiring in-house 
counsel, would result in future excess capacity, as well as to provide complex or unusual 
expertise that a company may not have in-house. In the near term, outside firms enjoy 
some reputational advantages over in-house lawyers because perceptions change slowly. 
Companies also may want to employ outside counsel at least occasionally in order to 
retain the benefits associated with continually examining and accessing outside 
opportunities through repeated contracting, as well as to remove incentives from in-house 
counsel to protectively hide or misrepresent true outside-counsel opportunities.  
 
 On the other hand, the transformation to in-house lawyering could reverse under 
various scenarios.234 For example, in-house lawyering would become less attractive, and 
                                                 
234 One such scenario not directly addressed by this article is the outsourcing of legal 
work to foreign law providers, such as sophisticated law firms in lower-cost countries 
like India. This recent development, driven by the spread of high-speed Internet 
communications (though ultimately restrained by differences in time zones and other 
logistical factors), does not involve competition between outside and in-house lawyers 
per se but, rather, between outside and in-house lawyers on the one hand and, on the 
other hand, the foreign law providers. See, e.g., e-mail from Gabe Shawn Varges, supra 
note 10 (observing that “[c]ertain types of legal services [such as routine contracts, 
contractual review work, due diligence, and the like] could be outsourced to providers in 
low cost jurisdictions, such as to move work away both from the in-house counsel and 
from the company’s normal [outside] law firms in the company’s home country”). See 
also Daniel Brook, Made in India: Are Your Lawyers in New York or Delhi?, LEG. 
AFFAIRS (May-June 2005); Jennifer Fried, Outsourcing Reaches Corporate Counsel, 
CORP. COUNSEL (Aug. 25, 2004). At present, not only foreign companies and law firms 
but also U.S. companies (such as Lumen Legal, formerly called “Contract Counsel,” 
http://www.lumenlegal.com; Prism Legal Consulting, http://www.prismlegal.com; and 
OfficeTiger, http://www.officetiger.com) are beginning to sell legal outsourcing services. 
See, e.g., Manjeet Kripalani, India’s Office Tiger: Hear it Roar, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, 
July 11, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_28/b3942429.htm 
(describing 1,500 employees “analyzing and processing U.S. Securities & Exchange 
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in-house lawyer competence would correspondingly fall, if companies reduce the quality-
of-life benefits that have been attracting lawyers to relatively low paying in-house jobs. 
To some extent, that may already be happening.235 The transformation also might reverse 
if in-house costs increase, a real possibility insofar as in-house salaries may be artificially 
low because of a path dependence.236 Similarly, the transformation may reverse or at least 
slow if the real costs of in-house counsel become more transparent to senior 
management; cost differentials between outside and in-house counsel are sometimes 
artificially magnified by lack of the latter’s transparency.237  
 
 It is even conceivable that the real costs of the transformation to in-house 
lawyering may sometimes exceed the costs of using outside counsel, and that part of the 
transformation might have resulted from such irrational factors as general counsel 
“empire building,” a herd mentality in building up legal departments,238 or even 
managerial over-consumption of legal services as a result of the very proximity of 
managers and in-house lawyers. Some overinvestment in in-house legal departments 
                                                                                                                                                 
Commission reports and other” legal and financial documents). For an analysis of the 
ethical constraints on outsourcing, see Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. 
On Professional & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-3 (Aug. 2006). Because legal 
outsourcing appears to have the most potential for work that is repetitive within a 
company, its impact is more likely to be felt by in-house rather than outside counsel. 
235 Cf. supra note 110 and accompanying text (observing that working in-house can be 
now just as demanding as working at a law firm). 
236 See supra notes 189-192 and accompanying text. 
237 See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text. 
238 Human beings generally see what they already are inclined to believe. It is reported, 
for example, that King Croesus of Lydia wanted to make war on Cyrus but was wary of 
doing so without heavenly sanction. After singling out the Delphic Oracle as the most 
reliable, the King’s messengers “asked the practical question about the advisability of 
Croesus going to war, and received the famous [and famously ambiguous] response that 
‘Croesus by crossing the Halys would destroy a mighty kingdom.’” THOMAS DEMPSEY, 
THE DELPHIC ORACLE: ITS EARLY HISTORY, INFLUENCE, AND FALL  70 (1918). Croesus 
interpreted this to mean what he wanted to hear–that Cyrus would fall—but in fact the 
empire that fell was his own. Id. at 71. See also id. at 71, 107 (discussing the historical 
method of the oracles as sheltering ignorance behind a “studied ambiguity” and 
vagueness). See also J. Barkley Rosser, Alternative Keynesian and Post Keynesian 
Perspectives on Uncertainty and Expectations, 23 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 545 (June 
22, 2001) (arguing that uncertainty leads to self-fulfilling mistakes). 
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would not be surprising, given that the market imperfections of using outside counsel239 
do not clearly appear to justify the degree of transformation that has taken place.240 
 
 This article also reveals ways in which companies can improve their utilization of 
lawyers and in which outside counsel can improve their competitive positions vis-à-vis 
in-house counsel. Regarding the former, the decision to assign lawyers to work on a 
given transaction is customarily made by the company’s general counsel, who often is 
also responsible for hiring the in-house legal staff.241 This inherent conflict of interest can 
bias a general counsel in favor of assigning in-house lawyers even when an outside law 
firm could be more effectively utilized. How companies might mitigate this bias, such as 
by making different individuals responsible for the hiring and assigning decisions, is an 
interesting question for further inquiry.242 
 
 Outside lawyers, on the other hand, dramatically disregard learning-curve costs, 
which could be mitigated by developing institutional knowledge about the law firm’s 
clients and teaching that knowledge to new lawyers.243 Outside lawyers additionally may 
want to be more sensitive to the importance that clients attach to timely availability and 
responsiveness.244 In that context, they might even try to get involved at earlier stages of 
                                                 
239 Those market imperfections are summarized supra notes 212-218 and accompanying 
text. 
240 See supra note 210 and accompanying text (observing that market mediation is 
generally to be preferred over internal supply except to overcome significant market 
imperfections). 
241 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.  
242 This question was originally posed by Professor Adam Feibelman, a colleague at 
University of North Carolina Law School. Cf. e-mail from Gabe Shawn Varges, supra 
note 10 (agreeing that this question “would be fascinating to explore,” and suggesting 
that, “in a legal model, since legal judgment would be needed to make the decision on in-
house versus external [counsel], it would require setting up a separate legal function 
(independent from the General Counsel) to make such decisions and assign work”). 
243 See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text. 
244 See supra notes 154-158 and accompanying text. 
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client transactions, perhaps by offering to charge lower rates during a transaction’s 
structuring phase.245  
 
 Outside lawyers also may want to pay attention to the fact that companies cannot 
compete for high quality in-house counsel based on monetary compensation but can (and 
do) compete based on the better lifestyle of in-house lawyers. Law firms thus can 
advance their viability by improving the quality of life of their own lawyers. 
 
 Outside lawyers do seem to understand, however, the importance of matching 
their expertise to complex or unusual client transactions. Top law firms, for example, are 
beginning to concentrate their efforts in just a few categories of highly complex and 
usually non-recurrent deals, such as mergers and acquisitions, corporate finance, 
structured finance, and project finance.246 
 
 Finally, this article suggests a possible change in legal education. Traditionally, 
legal ethics classes are taught from the standpoint of outside lawyers working at law 
firms that are independent from their clients. In-house lawyers, however, work for the 
very companies that are their clients, arguably necessitating that ethics be revisited from 
that quite different perspective.247    
                                                 
245 See supra note 162 and accompanying text (reporting that involvement at early stages 
of transactions helps to explain why in-house lawyers may provide greater benefits than 
outside lawyers). 
246 See Schwarcz, supra note 11, at __ (observing that concentration). Merger and 
acquisitions transactions involve the client acquiring, or being acquired by, another 
company, or buying or selling significant company assets; corporate finance transactions 
often involve the issuance of securities, which requires expertise in federal and 
sometimes also state securities laws; structured finance transactions utilize complicated 
special-purpose entities in complex bankruptcy-remote structures to obtain funding 
advantages; and project finance transactions utilize complex special-purpose entities to 
raise off-balance sheet financing for construction of major projects, such as powerplants. 
247 A significant recent contribution in this regard is MILTON C. REGAN, JR. & JEFFREY D. 
BAUMAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND CORPORATE PRACTICE 212-49 (2005) (devoting a full 
chapter to in-house counsel). One also might consider what should be the role of outside 
counsel, qua outside counsel, in a world of in-house lawyering. Cf. Robert W. Gordon, A 
New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 
1210 (2003) (noting that “events like the Enron collapse make one realize that the 
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corporate counselor would still have a useful role to play, if one could revive it as one of 
the legal profession’s many roles, to be deployed on occasions where clients and society 
would be best served by independent, public-regarding legal advice”) (emphasis added). 
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        ANNEX 1             
 
Company’s General Counsel Questionnaire 
This questionnaire is intended to be filled out by the company’s general counsel, chief 
legal officer, or other legal department manager (or such person’s designee) responsible 
for assigning transactional legal work, including the decision whether to handle a matter 
in-house or to retain the services of outside lawyers. Information you provide will 
remain strictly confidential and only be disclosed as part of aggregate data reporting. 
 
Position with Company: 
 
Responsibility for Assigning Legal Work: 
 
Years in Position(s) of Responsibility for Assigning Legal Work:  
 
Approximate Number of Attorneys in Legal Department: 
 
Nature of Company’s Business:  
 
State or Country of Company’s Corporate Headquarters: 
 
 
NOTICE: This questionnaire’s purpose is to test a range of hypotheses about the 
value or relative value provided by in-house and outside transactional lawyers and 
to assess any transformation therein. By “transactional lawyers,” this questionnaire 
means lawyers involved in the negotiating and contracting process leading to closing 
a commercial, financial, or other business transaction. Please assume that all 
questions below pertain to those types of business transactions. 
 
A.  
1.  In deciding which to use—in-house lawyers, or an outside law firm—as the primary 
lawyers on a business transaction, what considerations do you take into account (check 
all that apply)?:  
(a)__ size of the transaction 
(b)__ complexity or novelty of the transaction 
(c)__ riskiness of the transaction 
(d)__ perceived importance to senior management of successfully closing the transaction 
(e)__ anticipated legal expenses of the lawyers used 
(f)__ need for quality work 
(g)__ timely availability and responsiveness 
(h)__ other (please specify): ________________________________________________ 
 
2. Of the considerations you checked, how would you rank them in degree of importance 
(“A” being most important, “B” being next most important, and so on)?:  
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__ size of the transaction 
__ complexity or novelty of the transaction 
__ riskiness of the transaction 
__ perceived importance to senior management of successfully closing the transaction 
__ anticipated legal expenses of the lawyers used 
__ need for quality work 
__ timely availability and responsiveness 
__ other (if you so specified) 
 
3.  Which of the following factors help to explain why in-house lawyers may be a lower-
cost provider, compared to an outside law firm, of transactional legal services (check all 
that apply)?:  
(a)__ using in-house lawyers reduces incidental costs (e.g., visits to the client, talking 
through issues) 
(b)__ using in-house lawyers eliminates the need to educate an outside law firm about 
your company’s organization and operations 
(c)__ in-house lawyers tend to close transactions more quickly than law firms 
(d)__ effective “hourly rate” of in-house lawyers is lower 
(e)__ in-house lawyer costs are less visible to senior management  
(f)__ other (please specify) ________________________________________________ 
 
4.  Which of the following factors help to explain why an outside law firm may be a 
lower-cost provider, compared to in-house lawyers, of transactional legal services (check 
all that apply)?:  
(a)__ law firms tend to have more extensive knowledge of transactional law 
(b)__ when they must educate themselves on a point of transactional law, law firms can 
apportion the cost of this educational process among numerous clients 
(c)__ hiring a law firm can make it easier to match the number of in-house transactional 
lawyers on staff with the fluctuating volume of transactional work 
(d)__ law firms tend to close transactions more quickly than in-house lawyers 
(e)__ where the other side pays your legal fees, it is more common to pay outside lawyer 
fees than in-house lawyer imputed fees 
(f)__ other (please specify) _________________________________________________ 
 
5.  How would you compare the trend in in-house transactional lawyer salaries with the 
trend in outside law firm billing rates for transactional work (check all that apply)?:  
(a)__ both are increasing at about the same rate 
(b)__ in-house transactional lawyer salaries are increasing more rapidly than law firm 
billing rates 
(c)__ law firm billing rates are increasing more rapidly than in-house transactional lawyer 
salaries 
(d)__ other (please specify) ________________________________________________ 
 
6.  Which of the following factors help to explain why in-house lawyers may provide 
greater benefits, compared to an outside law firm, as the primary lawyers on a business 
transaction (check all that apply)?:  
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(a)__ in-house lawyers’ intimate familiarity with your company allows them to more 
quickly spot issues than outside lawyers 
(b)__ in-house lawyers are usually involved at a much earlier stage in the transaction than 
outside law firms and therefore can take a more proactive approach 
(c)__  in-house lawyers have a greater incentive to always ensure that your company is 
protected 
(d)__  in-house lawyers have greater expertise in certain types of transactions (specify 
which: ___________________) 
(e)__ in-house lawyers better understand the company’s “culture” 
(f)__ more timely availability and responsiveness of in-house lawyers 
(g)__ in-house lawyers have access to more and/or better resources (if you check this 
factor, please specify what resources): ________________________________________ 
(h)__  in-house lawyers perform higher quality transactional work 
(i)__ other (please specify): ________________________________________________ 
 
7.  Which of the following factors help to explain why an outside law firm may provide 
greater benefits, compared to in-house lawyers, as the primary lawyers on a business 
transaction (check all that apply)?:  
(a)__ a law firm’s more extensive knowledge of transactional law may allow them to spot 
issues that could be overlooked by in-house lawyers 
(b)__ law firms have access to more and/or better resources (if you check this factor, 
please specify what resources): _____________________________________________ 
(c)__ lawyers at outside firms are more independent, and thus more objective, than in-
house lawyers 
(d)__ lawyers at outside firms have greater expertise in certain types of transactions 
(specify which: ___________________) 
(e)__ law firms are specifically set up to get transactions done by having sufficient 
support staff (e.g., proofreading, photocopying, word processing, paralegals) to handle a 
large volume of transactions 
(f)__ more timely availability and responsiveness of lawyers at outside firms 
(g)__ lawyers at outside firms perform higher quality transactional work 
(h)__ other (please specify) ________________________________ 
 
8.  In-house transactional lawyer costs are (check all that apply):  
(a)__ less transparent to senior management than outside lawyer costs 
(b)__ as transparent to senior management as outside lawyer costs 
(c)__  absorbed in, or obscured by, other company costs 
(d)__ appropriately transparent to senior management 
 
B.  
1.  In deciding whether to use in-house lawyers or an outside law firm as the primary 
lawyers on a business transaction, to what extent do you take into account the lawyer’s 
ability to observe and report potential misbehavior by company managers working on the 
transaction?:  
(a)__ to a great extent 
(b)__ to a significant extent 
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(c)__ to some extent 
(d)__ to a small extent or not at all  
 
2.  Who can better observe misbehavior by company managers working on business 
transactions?:  
(a)__ in-house lawyers 
(b)__ lawyers at an outside law firm (hereinafter, “outside lawyers”) 
 
3.  Please explain your answer to the foregoing question: __________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.  Who is more likely to report misbehavior by company managers working on business 
transactions?:  
(a)__ in-house lawyers 
(b) __outside lawyers 
 
5.  Please explain your answer to the foregoing question: __________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________  
 
6.  When using outside lawyers as the primary lawyers on a business transaction, to what 
extent do you also use in-house lawyers to monitor their work?:  
(a)__ to a great extent 
(b)__ to a significant extent 
(c)__ to some extent 
(d)__ to a small extent or not at all 
 
7.  In the context of the prior question, which of the following do your in-house lawyers 
monitor (check all that apply)?:  
(a)__ outside lawyer billing 
(b)__ progression of the transaction 
(c)__ level of protection provided to the company 
(d)__ other (please specify): ________________________________________________. 
 
8.  To what extent does reducing the number of outside law firms used for transactional 
work (“convergence”) reduce the need for in-house lawyer monitoring of law firms used 
in business transactions?:  
(a)__ to a great extent 
(b)__ to a significant extent 
(c)__ to some extent 
(d)__ to a small extent or not at all 
 
C.  
1.  Approximately how many (significant) business transactions on average does your 
company engage in annually?: ____.  
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2.  Approximately what percentage of your company’s in-house lawyers spend all or 
substantially all of their time on transactional legal work: ____%. 
 
3.  Who handles repetitive transactions more efficiently, taking into account quality and 
cost?:  
(a)__ in-house lawyers 
(b)__ outside lawyers 
(c)__ it depends on the nature of the transaction 
 
4.  Please explain your answer to the foregoing question:__________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________.  
 
5.  Who handles non-repetitive transactions more efficiently, taking into account quality 
and cost?:  
(a)__ in-house lawyers 
(b)__ outside lawyers 
(c)__ it depends on the nature of the transaction 
 
6.  Please explain your answer to the foregoing question:__________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________. 
 
7.  Where a third party is expected to pay your company’s transactional legal fees, how 
likely is it that they would agree to pay your company’s in-house lawyer imputed fees 
(assuming in-house lawyers act as the primary transactional lawyers)?:  
(a)__ very likely 
(b)__ somewhat likely 
(c)__ unlikely 
 
 
D.  
1.  How much government regulation is your company subject to (compared to 
companies generally)?:  
(a)__ much more than average  
(b)__ somewhat more than average 
(c)__ about average 
(d)__ less than average 
(e)__ little or none 
 
2.  To what extent, if any, are your in-house transactional lawyers more familiar than 
your outside lawyers with the regulatory issues that impact your company’s 
transactions?: 
(a)__ much more familiar 
(b)__ somewhat more familiar 
(c)__ equally familiar 
(d)__ less familiar 
(e)__ it depends (please explain): ____________________________________________. 
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3.  If you answered (a) or (b) to the foregoing question, to what extent does that greater 
familiarity enable the in-house transactional lawyers to handle transactions more 
efficiently than outside lawyers, taking into account quality and cost?:  
(a)__ much more efficiently 
(b)__ somewhat more efficiently 
(c)__ not necessarily more efficiently 
(d)__ it depends (please explain): ____________________________________________. 
 
 
4. How complex is your company’s organization and operational structure (compared to 
that of companies generally)?:  
(a)__ much more complex than average 
(b)__ somewhat more complex than average 
(c)__ about average complexity 
(d)__ less complex than average 
 
5.  To what extent, if any, are your in-house transactional lawyers more familiar than 
your outside lawyers with issues of your company’s organization and operational 
structure that impact your company’s transactions?:  
(a)__ much more familiar 
(b)__ somewhat more familiar 
(c)__ equally familiar 
(d)__ less familiar 
(e)__ it depends (please explain): ____________________________________________. 
 
6.  If you answered (a) or (b) to the foregoing question, to what extent does that greater 
familiarity enable the in-house transactional lawyers to handle transactions more 
efficiently than outside lawyers, taking into account quality and cost?:  
(a)__ much more efficiently 
(b)__ somewhat more efficiently 
(c)__ not necessarily more efficiently 
(d)__ it depends (please explain): ____________________________________________. 
 
7.  Approximately how many outside law firms, overall, does your company use for 
transactional work?: _____. 
 
8.  To what extent could your company, by reducing the number of outside law firms 
used for transactional work, achieve greater parity between in-house and outside lawyer 
familiarity with regulatory, organizational, and operational issues that impact the 
company’s transactions?:  
(a)__ to a great extent 
(b)__ to some extent 
(c)__ to a small extent or not at all  
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9.  Has your company already reduced the number of outside law firms used for 
transactional work to try to achieve that parity?:  
(a)__ yes 
(b)__ no 
 
E.  
1.  Who are more responsive to your company’s timing requirements in business 
transactions?:  
(a)__ in-house transactional lawyers 
(b)__ outside transactional lawyers 
(c)__ about the same 
 
2.  Who are better able to communicate with your company’s management in business 
transactions?:  
(a)__ in-house transactional lawyers 
(b)__ outside transactional lawyers 
(c)__ about the same 
(d)__ it depends (please explain): ____________________________________________. 
 
3.  Check all of the following that describes your company’s in-house transactional 
lawyers:  
(a)__ they are located in the corporate headquarters and have regular (formal or informal) 
contact with senior management 
(b)___ they are located in the corporate headquarters but have little contact with senior 
management 
(c)__ they are located in regional offices and have regular (formal or informal) contact 
with management at their locations 
(d)__ they are located in regional offices but have little contact with management at their 
locations 
 
4.  Are in-house transactional lawyers typically more involved in structuring your 
company’s business transactions than outside lawyers?:  
(a)__ yes 
(b)__ no 
(c)__ it depends (please explain): ____________________________________________.  
 
F.  
1.  To what extent does using outside transactional lawyers enhance your company’s 
reputation in a transaction (“reputational value”) more than using in-house lawyers?: 
(a)__ to a great extent 
(b)__ to some extent 
(c)__ not at all 
(d)__ it depends on the transaction. 
 
2.  Why might outside transactional lawyers provide greater reputational value than in-
house transactional lawyers (check all that apply)?:  
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(a)__ outside transactional lawyers are independent, whereas in-house transactional 
lawyers are employees of the company 
(b)__  outside transactional lawyers are, on average, more qualified than in-house 
transactional lawyers for the work they do 
(c)__ outside transactional lawyers may be no more qualified, but reputational 
perceptions change slowly 
(d)__ other (please specify) ________________________________________________. 
 
3.  Why might outside transactional lawyers, on average, be more qualified than in-house 
transactional lawyers for transactional work (check all that apply)?:  
(a)__ outside transactional lawyers are, on average, smarter than in-house transactional 
lawyers 
(b)__ outside transactional lawyers are, on average, better legally educated than in-house 
transactional lawyers 
(c)__ outside transactional lawyers see the type of transaction more often 
(d)__ other (please explain): ________________________________________________.  
 
4.  To what extent are you able to compete with outside law firms in hiring the best 
lawyers for your in-house transactional staff?:  
(a)__ to a great extent 
(b)__ to a significant extent 
(c)__ to some extent 
(d)__ to a small extent or not at all 
 
5.  If you answered (a), (b), or (c) to the foregoing question, what may explain your 
ability to compete?: 
(a)__ higher compensation paid to lawyers on your in-house transactional staff 
(b)__ lower stress/better lifestyle of lawyers on your in-house transactional staff 
(c)__ more flexible hours available to lawyers on your in-house transactional staff 
(d)__ other (please explain): ________________________________________________. 
 
6.  To what extent do you hire outside transactional lawyers in business transactions 
simply because other parties request legal opinions of your independent outside lawyers?: 
(a)__ to a great extent 
(b)__ to a significant extent 
(c)__ to some extent 
(d)__ to a small extent or not at all 
 
7.  When a third party requests a legal opinion in a business transaction (on matters other 
than corporate housekeeping), how often will that party accept an opinion issued by your 
in-house transactional lawyers?:  
(a)__ almost always 
(b)__ often 
(c)__ occasionally 
(d)__ rarely 
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G.  
1.  To what extent does the attorney-client privilege help facilitate your company’s 
business transactions?:  
(a)__ to a great extent 
(b)__ to a significant extent 
(c)__ to some extent 
(d)__ to a small extent or not at all 
(e)__ the attorney-client privilege works against facilitating transactions (for example, by 
increasing information asymmetry among transaction parties) 
 
2.  How does the in-house attorney-client privilege compare to the attorney-client 
privilege created by using outside transactional lawyers?:  
(a)__ in-house privilege is much weaker 
(b)__ in-house privilege is somewhat weaker 
(c)__ in-house privilege is about the same 
(d)__ in-house privilege is somewhat stronger 
(e)__ in-house privilege is much stronger 
 
3.  All other things being equal, would you consider hiring an outside law firm to handle 
a “sensitive” transaction simply to take advantage of the stronger (or perceived stronger) 
attorney-client privilege?:  
(a)__ yes 
(b)__ no 
(c)__ possibly 
 
 
H.  
1.  Approximately what percentage of your company’s business transactions are currently 
lawyered primarily in-house?: ___%. 
 
2.  If the current percentage is less than the percentage of your company’s business 
transactions that you would like to see lawyered in-house, what accounts for the 
discrepancy (check all that apply):  
(a)__ difficulty in matching number of in-house transactional lawyers on staff with 
fluctuating volume of transactional work 
(b)__ outside law firms have the expertise necessary for complex or unusual transactions 
(c)__ third parties sometimes insist that your company uses an outside law firm 
(d)__ other (please specify) ________________________________________________. 
  
3.  How does the percentage of business transactions currently lawyered in-house 
compare with the percentage lawyered in-house ten years ago?:  
(a)__ currently much lower 
(b)__ currently slightly lower 
(c)__ currently about the same 
(d)__ currently slightly higher 
(e)__ currently much higher  
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4.  Please comment on the following proposition: “There has been no transformation in 
the inherent value provided by in-house and outside transactional lawyers. Rather, the 
shift from outside to in-house transactional lawyers has been occurring because 
burgeoning legal costs have made companies more sensitive to legal bills. At the same 
time, transactional legal work has matured and become more straightforward and 
companies have grown and engage in repetitive transactions, making it more feasible to 
bring legal work in-house and save costs.” 
Your comments: __________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________. 
 
5.  Are there any other factors, not mentioned in this questionnaire, that might explain the 
shift from outside to in-house transactional lawyering or a transformation in the value or 
relative value provided by in-house and outside transactional lawyers?:_______________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________. 
 
6.  To the best of your knowledge, would you answer any of the questions in Parts A-G of 
this questionnaire differently if you were responding 10 years ago? If so, please explain 
(ignore questions that ask for specific numbers): ________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________. 
 
7.  Please try to answer the preceding question as if the reference to “10 years ago” read 
“20 years ago”: ___________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________. 
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       ANNEX 2 
 
 
Outside Counsel Questionnaire 
Information you provide will remain strictly confidential and only be disclosed as part 
of aggregate data reporting. 
 
Position with Law Firm: 
 
Areas of Practice: 
 
Years of Practice:  
 
City in Which You Practice: 
 
Approximate Number of Attorneys in Your Law Firm: 
 
 
NOTICE: This questionnaire’s purpose is to test a range of hypotheses about the 
value or relative value provided by in-house and outside transactional lawyers and 
to assess any transformation therein. By “transactional lawyers,” this questionnaire 
means lawyers involved in the negotiating and contracting process leading to closing 
a commercial, financial, or other business transaction. Please assume that all 
questions below pertain to those types of business transactions. 
 
 
A.  
1.  In deciding which to use—in-house lawyers, or an outside law firm—as the primary 
lawyers on a business transaction, what considerations do clients take into account (check 
all that apply)?:  
(a)__ size of the transaction 
(b)__ complexity or novelty of the transaction 
(c)__ riskiness of the transaction 
(d)__ perceived importance to senior management of successfully closing the transaction 
(e)__ anticipated legal expenses of the lawyers used 
(f)__ need for quality work 
(g)__ timely availability and responsiveness 
(h)__ other (please specify): ________________________________________________ 
 
2. Of the considerations you checked, how would you rank them in degree of importance 
(“A” being most important, “B” being next most important, and so on)?:  
__ size of the transaction 
__ complexity or novelty of the transaction 
__ riskiness of the transaction 
__ perceived importance to senior management of successfully closing the transaction 
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__ anticipated legal expenses of the lawyers used 
__ need for quality work 
__ timely availability and responsiveness 
__ other (if you so specified) 
 
3.  Which of the following factors help to explain why in-house lawyers may be a lower-
cost provider, compared to an outside law firm, of transactional legal services (check all 
that apply)?:  
(a)__ using in-house lawyers reduces incidental costs (e.g., visits to the client, talking 
through issues) 
(b)__ using in-house lawyers eliminates the need to educate an outside law firm about the 
client’s organization and operations 
(c)__ in-house lawyers tend to close transactions more quickly than law firms 
(d)__ effective “hourly rate” of in-house lawyers is lower 
(e)__ in-house lawyer costs are less visible to senior management  
(f)__ other (please specify) ________________________________________________ 
 
4.  Which of the following factors help to explain why an outside law firm may be a 
lower-cost provider, compared to in-house lawyers, of transactional legal services (check 
all that apply)?:  
(a)__ law firms tend to have more extensive knowledge of transactional law 
(b)__ when they must educate themselves on a point of transactional law, law firms can 
apportion the cost of this educational process among numerous clients 
(c)__ hiring a law firm can make it easier to match the number of in-house transactional 
lawyers on staff with the fluctuating volume of transactional work 
(d)__ law firms tend to close transactions more quickly than in-house lawyers 
(e)__ where the other side pays the client’s legal fees, it is more common to pay outside 
lawyer fees than in-house lawyer imputed fees 
(f)__ other (please specify) _________________________________________________ 
 
5.  How would you compare the trend in in-house transactional lawyer salaries with the 
trend in outside law firm billing rates for transactional work?:  
(a)__ both are increasing at about the same rate 
(b)__ in-house transactional lawyer salaries are increasing more rapidly than law firm 
billing rates 
(c)__ law firm billing rates are increasing more rapidly than in-house transactional lawyer 
salaries 
(d)__ do not know 
 
6.  Which of the following factors help to explain why in-house lawyers may provide 
greater benefits, compared to an outside law firm, as the primary lawyers on a business 
transaction (check all that apply)?:  
(a)__ in-house lawyers’ intimate familiarity with the client allows them to more quickly 
spot issues than outside lawyers 
(b)__ in-house lawyers are usually involved at a much earlier stage in the transaction than 
outside law firms and therefore can take a more proactive approach 
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(c)__  in-house lawyers have a greater incentive to always ensure that the client is 
protected 
(d)__  in-house lawyers have greater expertise in certain types of transactions (specify 
which: ___________________) 
(e)__ in-house lawyers better understand the client’s “culture” 
(f)__ more timely availability and responsiveness of in-house lawyers 
(g)__ in-house lawyers have access to more and/or better resources (if you check this 
factor, please specify what resources): ________________________________________ 
(h)__  in-house lawyers perform higher quality transactional work 
(i)__ other (please specify): ________________________________________________ 
 
7.  Which of the following factors help to explain why an outside law firm may provide 
greater benefits, compared to in-house lawyers, as the primary lawyers on a business 
transaction (check all that apply)?:  
(a)__ a law firm’s more extensive knowledge of transactional law may allow them to spot 
issues that could be overlooked by in-house lawyers 
(b)__ law firms have access to more and/or better resources (if you check this factor, 
please specify what resources): _____________________________________________ 
(c)__ lawyers at outside firms are more independent, and thus more objective, than in-
house lawyers 
(d)__ lawyers at outside firms have greater expertise in certain types of transactions 
(specify which: ___________________) 
(e)__ law firms are specifically set up to get transactions done by having sufficient 
support staff (e.g., proofreading, photocopying, word processing, paralegals) to handle a 
large volume of transactions 
(f)__ more timely availability and responsiveness of lawyers at outside firms 
(g)__ lawyers at outside firms perform higher quality transactional work 
(h)__ other (please specify) ________________________________ 
 
 
B.  
1.  [Intentionally deleted] 
 
2.  Who can better observe misbehavior by company managers working on business 
transactions?:  
(a)__ in-house lawyers 
(b)__ lawyers at an outside law firm (hereinafter, “outside lawyers”) 
 
3.  Please explain your answer to the foregoing question: __________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.  Who is more likely to report misbehavior by company managers working on business 
transactions?:  
(a)__ in-house lawyers 
(b) __outside lawyers 
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5.  Please explain your answer to the foregoing question: __________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________  
 
6.  To what extent do clients use in-house lawyers to monitor outside-lawyer work on 
business transactions?:  
(a)__ to a great extent 
(b)__ to a significant extent 
(c)__ to some extent 
(d)__ to a small extent or not at all 
 
7.  In the context of the prior question, which of the following do in-house lawyers 
monitor (check all that apply)?:  
(a)__ outside lawyer billing 
(b)__ progression of the transaction 
(c)__ level of protection provided to the company 
(d)__ other (please specify): ________________________________________________. 
 
 
C.  
1.  [Intentionally deleted]  
 
2.  [Intentionally deleted] 
 
3.  Who handles repetitive transactions more efficiently, taking into account quality and 
cost?:  
(a)__ in-house lawyers 
(b)__ outside lawyers 
(c)__ it depends on the nature of the transaction 
 
4.  Please explain your answer to the foregoing question:__________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________.  
 
5.  Who handles non-repetitive transactions more efficiently, taking into account quality 
and cost?:  
(a)__ in-house lawyers 
(b)__ outside lawyers 
(c)__ it depends on the nature of the transaction 
 
6.  Please explain your answer to the foregoing question:__________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________. 
 
 
D.  
1. The fees charged by outside transactional lawyers are as high as they are because 
(check all that apply):  
(a)__ law firms have to compete with investment banks for top transactional people 
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(b)__ law firms pay a premium to hire and train the best entry-level associates 
(c)__ law firms try to maintain a degree of income parity among lawyers at the same 
level working in different areas of concentration even though some transactional areas are 
less inherently lucrative than other areas 
(d)__ other (please specify): ________________________________________________. 
 
2. Why do law firms pay a premium to hire and train the best entry-level associates?: ___ 
_______________________________________________________________________. 
 
 
E.  
1.  Who are more responsive to a client’s timing requirements in business transactions?:  
(a)__ in-house transactional lawyers 
(b)__ outside transactional lawyers 
(c)__ about the same 
(d)__ do not know 
 
2.  Who are better able to communicate with a client’s management in business 
transactions?:  
(a)__ in-house transactional lawyers 
(b)__ outside transactional lawyers 
(c)__ about the same 
(d)__ it depends (please explain): ____________________________________________. 
 
3.  [Intentionally deleted]  
 
 
F.  
1.  To what extent does using outside transactional lawyers enhance a client’s reputation 
in a transaction (“reputational value”) more than using in-house lawyers?: 
(a)__ to a great extent 
(b)__ to some extent 
(c)__ not at all 
(d)__ it depends on the transaction 
 
2.  Why might outside transactional lawyers provide greater reputational value than in-
house transactional lawyers (check all that apply)?:  
(a)__ outside transactional lawyers are independent, whereas in-house transactional 
lawyers are employees of the client 
(b)__  outside transactional lawyers are, on average, more qualified than in-house 
transactional lawyers for the work they do 
(c)__ outside transactional lawyers may be no more qualified, but reputational 
perceptions change slowly 
(d)__ other (please specify): ________________________________________________. 
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3.  Why might outside transactional lawyers, on average, be more qualified than in-house 
transactional lawyers for transactional work (check all that apply)?:  
(a)__ outside transactional lawyers are, on average, smarter than in-house transactional 
lawyers 
(b)__ outside transactional lawyers are, on average, better legally educated than in-house 
transactional lawyers 
(c)__ outside transactional lawyers see the type of transaction more often 
(d)__ other (please explain): ________________________________________________.  
 
4.  To what extent is your law firm able to compete with in-house legal departments in 
hiring the best lawyers for transactional work?:  
(a)__ to a great extent 
(b)__ to a significant extent 
(c)__ to some extent 
(d)__ to a small extent or not at all 
 
5.  If you answered (a), (b), or (c) to the foregoing question, what may explain your 
ability to compete? (check all that apply)?: 
(a)__ your law firm pays higher compensation 
(b)__ your law firm engages in more interesting and diverse transactions  
(c)__ there is greater prestige associated with your law firm 
(d)__ other (please explain): ________________________________________________. 
 
 
G.  
1.  To what extent does the attorney-client privilege help facilitate business transactions?:  
(a)__ to a great extent 
(b)__ to a significant extent 
(c)__ to some extent 
(d)__ to a small extent or not at all 
(e)__ the attorney-client privilege works against facilitating transactions (for example, by 
increasing information asymmetry among transaction parties) 
 
2.  How does the in-house attorney-client privilege compare to the attorney-client 
privilege created by using outside transactional lawyers?:  
(a)__ in-house privilege is much weaker 
(b)__ in-house privilege is somewhat weaker 
(c)__ in-house privilege is about the same 
(d)__ in-house privilege is somewhat stronger 
(e)__ in-house privilege is much stronger 
 
 
H.  
1.  Is there increasing in-house lawyer competition for outside lawyer transactional legal 
work? (check all that apply): 
(a)__ yes 
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(b)__ no 
(c)__ although in-house lawyers may be doing more transactional legal work, they are not 
doing the sophisticated or complex work done by outside lawyers 
(d)__ although in-house lawyers may be doing more transactional legal work, overall 
transactional legal work is expanding sufficiently to mitigate outside lawyer concerns 
about competition  
 
2.  How, if applicable, is your law firm attempting to adapt to in-house lawyering 
competition for transactional legal work?: _____________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________. 
 
3.  How else might law firms attempt to adapt to in-house lawyering competition for 
transactional legal work?: __________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________.  
 
4.  Please comment on the following proposition: “There has been no transformation in 
the inherent value provided by in-house and outside transactional lawyers. Rather, the 
shift from outside to in-house transactional lawyering has been occurring because 
burgeoning legal costs have made companies more sensitive to legal bills. At the same 
time, transactional legal work has matured and become more straightforward and 
companies have grown and engage in repetitive transactions, making it more feasible to 
bring legal work in-house and save costs.” 
Your comments: __________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________. 
 
5.  Are there any other factors, not mentioned in this questionnaire, that might explain the 
shift from outside to in-house transactional lawyering or a transformation in the value or 
relative value provided by in-house and outside transactional lawyers?:_______________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________. 
 
6.  To the best of your knowledge, would you answer any of the questions in Parts A-G of 
this questionnaire differently if you were responding 10 years ago? If so, please explain 
(ignore questions that ask for specific numbers): ________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________. 
 
7.  Please try to answer the preceding question as if the reference to “10 years ago” read 
“20 years ago”: ___________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________. 
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED PRESENTATION OF THE DATA UNDERLYING THIS ARTICLE’S 
FINDINGS 
 
Notes:  
(1) References below in each data box’s heading to “In-House Lawyers” means the 
general counsel, chief legal officer, or other legal department manager (or such person’s 
designee) responsible for assigning transactional legal work, including the decision 
whether to handle a matter in-house or to retain the services of outside lawyers. 
(2) References below in each data box’s heading to “Outside Lawyers” means outside 
transactional lawyers. 
(3) The wording of questions and possible answers set forth below is taken from ANNEX 
1, the form of Company’s General Counsel Questionnaire. The wording of questions and 
possible answers in the form of Outside Counsel Questionnaire varied slightly. See 
ANNEX 2 (Form of Outside Counsel Questionnaire).  
(4) For some questions, the number of General Counsel respondents equaled 44 (n=44), 
whereas for other questions the number of General Counsel respondents equaled 59 
(n=59). The 44 respondents answered the full ten-page Company’s General Counsel 
Questionnaire, whereas an additional 15 respondents answered the abbreviated 
Company’s General Counsel Questionnaire. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
  
[Note also: Only 14 Outside Lawyer responses 
are included in these data. The final 
published paper will include many more such 
responses, now being collected (and so far 
generally consistent with the results shown 
below).] 
 
A.     
     
1. In deciding which to use—in-house lawyers, or an outside law firm—as the primary lawyers on a 
business transaction, what considerations do you take into account (check all that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) size of the transaction 27 61.4 13 92.9
(b) complexity or novelty of the transaction 41 93.2 14 100.0
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(c) riskiness of the transaction 29 65.9 12 85.7
(d) perceived importance to senior management of 
successfully closing the transaction 19 43.2 11 78.6
(e) anticipated legal expenses of the lawyers used 30 68.2 9 64.3
(f) need for quality work 14 31.8 9 64.3
(g) timely availability and responsiveness 32 72.7 13 92.9
(h) other 9 20.5 4 28.6
      
      
2.  Of the considerations you checked, how would you rank them in degree of importance (“A” being most 
important, “B” being next most important, and so on)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
*Number that ranked A  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) size of the transaction 1 2.3 2 14.3
(b) complexity or novelty of the transaction 26 59.1 9 64.3
(c) riskiness of the transaction 5 11.4 1 7.1
(d) perceived importance to senior management of 
successfully closing the transaction 2 4.5 1 7.1
(e) anticipated legal expenses of the lawyers used 3 6.8 0 0.0
(f) need for quality work 2 4.5 0 0.0
(g) timely availability and responsiveness 3 6.8 1 7.1
(h) other 5 11.4 0 0.0
     
     
3.  Which of the following factors help to explain why in-house lawyers may be a lower-cost provider, 
compared to an outside law firm, of transactional legal services (check all that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=59)   (n1=14)   
(a) using in-house lawyers reduces incidental costs 40 67.8 3 21.4
(b) using in-house lawyers eliminates the need to educate 
an outside law firm about your company’s organization 
and operations 50 84.7 7 50.0
(c) -house lawyers tend to close transactions more quickly 
than law firms 25 42.4 0 0.0
(d) effective “hourly rate” of in-house lawyers is lower 49 83.1 12 85.7
(e) in-house lawyer costs are less visible to senior 
management 21 35.6 8 57.1
(f) other 8 13.6 3 21.4
     
     
4.  Which of the following factors help to explain why an outside law firm may be a lower-cost provider, 
compared to in-house lawyers, of transactional legal services (check all that apply)?: 
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  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=59)   (n1=14)   
(a) law firms tend to have more extensive knowledge of 
transactional law 31 52.5 9 64.3
(b) when they must educate themselves on a point of 
transactional law, law firms can apportion the cost of this 
educational process among numerous clients 15 25.4 4 28.6
(c) hiring a law firm can make it easier to match the 
number of in-house transactional lawyers on staff with the 
fluctuating volume of transactional work 24 40.7 13 92.9
(d) law firms tend to close transactions more quickly than 
in-house lawyers 3 5.1 4 28.6
(e) where the other side pays your legal fees, it is more 
common to pay outside lawyer fees than in-house lawyer 
imputed fees 16 27.1 6 42.9
(f) other 12 20.3 2 14.3
     
     
5.  How would you compare the trend in in-house transactional lawyer salaries with the trend in outside 
law firm billing rates for transactional work (check all that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) both are increasing at about the same rate 4 9.1 1 7.1
(b) in-house transactional lawyer salaries are increasing 
more rapidly than law firm billing rates 0 0.0 0 0.0
(c) law firm billing rates are increasing more rapidly than 
in-house transactional lawyer salaries 40 90.9 4 28.6
(d) other 1 2.3 9 64.3
     
     
6.  Which of the following factors help to explain why in-house lawyers may provide greater benefits, 
compared to an outside law firm, as the primary lawyers on a business transaction (check all that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=59)   (n1=14)   
(a) in-house lawyers’ intimate familiarity with your 
company allows them to more quickly spot issues than 
outside lawyers 59 100.0 11 78.6
(b) in-house lawyers are usually involved at a much earlier 
stage in the transaction than outside law firms and 
therefore can take a more proactive approach 53 89.8 8 57.1
(c) in-house lawyers have a greater incentive to always 
ensure that your company is protected 20 33.9 0 0.0
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(d) in-house lawyers have greater expertise in certain types 
of transactions 12 20.3 2 14.3
(e) in-house lawyers better understand the company’s 
“culture” 49 83.1 6 42.9
(f) more timely availability and responsiveness of in-house 
lawyers 34 57.6 1 7.1
(g) in-house lawyers have access to more and/or better 
resources 10 16.9 0 0.0
h) in-house lawyers perform higher quality transactional 
work 7 11.9 0 0.0
(i) other 4 6.8 1 7.1
     
     
7.  Which of the following factors help to explain why an outside law firm may provide greater benefits, 
compared to in-house lawyers, as the primary lawyers on a business transaction (check all that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=59)   (n1=14)   
(a) a law firm’s more extensive knowledge of transactional 
law may allow them to spot issues that could be 
overlooked by in-house lawyers 38 86.4 13 92.9
(b) law firms have access to more and/or better resources 30 68.2 11 78.6
(c) lawyers at outside firms are more independent, and 
thus more objective, than in-house lawyers 14 31.8 2 14.3
(d) lawyers at outside firms have greater expertise in 
certain types of transactions 31 70.5 7 50.0
(e) law firms are specifically set up to get transactions 
done by having sufficient support staff (e.g., proofreading, 
photocopying, word processing, paralegals) to handle a 
large volume of transactions 38 86.4 12 85.7
(f) more timely availability and responsiveness of lawyers 
at outside firms 7 15.9 9 64.3
(g) lawyers at outside firms perform higher quality 
transactional work 3 6.8 6 42.9
(h) other 0 0.0 0 0.0
     
     
8.  In-house transactional lawyer costs are (check all that apply): 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) less transparent to senior management than outside 
lawyer costs 15 34.1 N/A N/A 
(b) as transparent to senior management as outside lawyer 
costs 6 13.6 N/A N/A 
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(c) absorbed in, or obscured by, other company costs 17 38.6 N/A N/A 
(d) appropriately transparent to senior management 20 45.5 N/A N/A 
     
     
     
B.      
     
1.  In deciding whether to use in-house lawyers or an outside law firm as the primary lawyers on a 
business transaction, to what extent do you take into account the lawyer’s ability to observe and report 
potential misbehavior by company managers working on the transaction?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) to a great extent 2 4.5 N/A N/A 
(b) to a significant extent 2 4.5 N/A N/A 
(c) to some extent 17 38.6 N/A N/A 
(d) to a small extent or not at all 23 52.3 N/A N/A 
     
     
2.  Who can better observe misbehavior by company managers working on business transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) in-house lawyers 41 93.2 9 64.3
(b) lawyers at an outside law firm (hereinafter, “outside 
lawyers”) 1 2.3 4 28.6
     
     
3.  Please explain your answer to the foregoing question: 
     
     
4.  Who is more likely to report misbehavior by company managers working on business transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) in-house lawyers 39 88.6 1 7.1
(b) outside lawyers 1 2.3 9 64.3
     
     
5.  Please explain your answer to the foregoing question:     
     
     
6.  When using outside lawyers as the primary lawyers on a business transaction, to what extent do you 
also use in-house lawyers to monitor their work?: 
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  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=59)   (n1=14)   
(a) to a great extent 29 49.2 4 28.6
(b) to a significant extent 23 39.0 8 57.1
(c) to some extent 6 10.2 3 21.4
(d) to a small extent or not at all 1 1.7 0 0.0
     
     
7.  In the context of the prior question, which of the following do your in-house lawyers monitor (check all 
that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=59)   (n1=14)   
(a) outside lawyer billing 51 86.4 13 92.9
(b) progression of the transaction 57 96.6 13 92.9
(c) level of protection provided to the company 48 81.4 6 42.9
(d) other 18 30.5 2 14.3
     
     
8.  To what extent does reducing the number of outside law firms used for transactional work 
(“convergence”) reduce the need for in-house lawyer monitoring of law firms used in business 
transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) to a great extent 2 4.5 N/A N/A 
(b) to a significant extent 5 11.4 N/A N/A 
(c) to some extent 19 43.2 N/A N/A 
(d) to a small extent or not at all 17 38.6 N/A N/A 
     
     
C.      
     
1.  Approximately how many (significant) business transactions on average does your company engage in 
annually?: 
     
 General Counsel   
 Average     
 (n=59)     
 152     
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2.  Approximately what percentage of your company’s in-house lawyers spend all or substantially all of 
their time on transactional legal work: ____%. 
     
 General Counsel   
 Average     
 (n=59)     
 38     
     
3.  Who handles repetitive transactions more efficiently, taking into account quality and cost?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) in-house lawyers 9 20.5 5 35.7
(b) outside lawyers 6 13.6 1 7.1
(c) it depends on the nature of the transaction 29 65.9 8 57.1
     
     
4.  Please explain your answer to the foregoing question: 
     
5.  Who handles non-repetitive transactions more efficiently, taking into account quality and cost?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) in-house lawyers 9 20.5 1 7.1
(b) outside lawyers 6 13.6 8 57.1
(c) it depends on the nature of the transaction 29 65.9 4 28.6
     
     
6.  Please explain your answer to the foregoing question: 
     
7.  Where a third party is expected to pay your company’s transactional legal fees, how likely is it that 
they would agree to pay your company’s in-house lawyer imputed fees (assuming in-house lawyers act as 
the primary transactional lawyers)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) very likely 1 2.3 N/A N/A 
(b) somewhat likely 8 18.2 N/A N/A 
(c) unlikely 35 79.5 N/A N/A 
     
     
D.      
     
1.  How much government regulation is your company subject to (compared to companies generally)?: 
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  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) much more than average 16 36.4 N/A N/A 
(b) somewhat more than average 6 13.6 N/A N/A 
(c) about average 10 22.7 N/A N/A 
(d) less than average 10 22.7 N/A N/A 
(e) little or none 2 4.5 N/A N/A 
     
[Outside Counsel Only] 1. The fees charged by outside transactional lawyers are as high as they are 
because (check all that apply):  
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
  Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a)__ law firms have to compete with investment banks 
for top transactional people N/A N/A 1 7.1
(b)__ law firms pay a premium to hire and train the best 
entry-level associates N/A N/A 6 42.9
(c)__ law firms try to maintain a degree of income parity 
among lawyers at the same level working in different 
areas of concentration even though some transactional 
areas are less inherently lucrative than other areas N/A N/A 2 14.3
(d)__ other (please specify): N/A N/A 8 57.1
     
2.  To what extent, if any, are your in-house transactional lawyers more familiar than your outside lawyers 
with the regulatory issues that impact your company’s transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) much more familiar 11 25.0 N/A N/A 
(b) somewhat more familiar 15 34.1 N/A N/A 
(c) equally familiar 9 20.5 N/A N/A 
(d) less familiar 6 13.6 N/A N/A 
(e) it depends 3 6.8 N/A N/A 
     
     
3.  If you answered (a) or (b) to the foregoing question, to what extent does that greater familiarity enable 
the in-house transactional lawyers to handle transactions more efficiently than outside lawyers, taking into 
account quality and cost?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
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(a) much more efficiently 6 13.6 N/A N/A 
(b) somewhat more efficiently 14 31.8 N/A N/A 
(c) not necessarily more efficiently 5 11.4 N/A N/A 
(d) it depends 2 4.5 N/A N/A 
     
     
4. How complex is your company’s organization and operational structure (compared to that of companies 
generally)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) much more complex than average 5 11.4 N/A N/A 
(b) somewhat more complex than average 9 20.5 N/A N/A 
(c) about average complexity 16 36.4 N/A N/A 
(d) less complex than average 14 31.8 N/A N/A 
     
     
5.  To what extent, if any, are your in-house transactional lawyers more familiar than your outside lawyers 
with issues of your company’s organization and operational structure that impact your company’s 
transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) much more familiar 24 54.5 N/A N/A 
(b) somewhat more familiar 11 25.0 N/A N/A 
(c) equally familiar 4 9.1 N/A N/A 
(d) less familiar 4 9.1 N/A N/A 
(e) it depends 1 2.3 N/A N/A 
     
     
6.  If you answered (a) or (b) to the foregoing question, to what extent does that greater familiarity enable 
the in-house transactional lawyers to handle transactions more efficiently than outside lawyers, taking into 
account quality and cost?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) much more efficiently 14 31.8 N/A N/A 
(b) somewhat more efficiently 18 40.9 N/A N/A 
(c) not necessarily more efficiently 3 6.8 N/A N/A 
(d) it depends 0 0.0 N/A N/A 
     
     
7.  Approximately how many outside law firms, overall, does your company use for transactional work?: 
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 General Counsel  
Average     
 (n=59)     
 6     
     
8.  To what extent could your company, by reducing the number of outside law firms used for 
transactional work, achieve greater parity between in-house and outside lawyer familiarity with regulatory, 
organizational, and operational issues that impact the company’s transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=59)   (n1=14)   
(a) to a great extent 2 3.4 N/A N/A 
(b) to some extent 54 91.5 N/A N/A 
(c) to a small extent or not at all 1 1.7 N/A N/A 
     
     
9.  Has your company already reduced the number of outside law firms used for transactional work to try 
to achieve that parity?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=59)   (n1=14)   
(a) yes 33 55.9 N/A N/A 
(b) no 26 44.1 N/A N/A 
     
     
E.      
     
1.  Who are more responsive to your company’s timing requirements in business transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) in-house transactional lawyers 23 52.3 0 0.0
(b) outside transactional lawyers 2 4.5 6 42.9
(c) about the same 19 43.2 3 21.4
     
     
2.  Who are better able to communicate with your company’s management in business transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) in-house transactional lawyers 30 68.2 1 7.1
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(b) outside transactional lawyers 0 0.0 1 7.1
(c) about the same 12 27.3 7 50.0
(d) it depends 3 6.8 7 50.0
     
     
3.  Check all of the following that describes your company’s in-house transactional lawyers: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) they are located in the corporate headquarters and have 
regular (formal or informal) contact with senior 
management 42 95.5 N/A N/A 
(b) they are located in the corporate headquarters but have 
little contact with senior management 2 4.5 N/A N/A 
(c) they are located in regional offices and have regular 
(formal or informal) contact with management at their 
locations 5 11.4 N/A N/A 
(d) they are located in regional offices but have little 
contact with management at their locations 0 0.0 N/A N/A 
     
     
4.  Are in-house transactional lawyers typically more involved in structuring your company’s business 
transactions than outside lawyers?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=59)   (n1=14)   
(a) yes 43 72.9 N/A N/A 
(b) no 3 5.1 N/A N/A 
(c) it depends 13 22.0 N/A N/A 
     
     
F.      
     
1.  To what extent does using outside transactional lawyers enhance your company’s reputation in a 
transaction (“reputational value”) more than using in-house lawyers?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) to a great extent 2 4.5 1 7.1
(b) to some extent 28 63.6 5 35.7
(c) not at all 0 0.0 2 14.3
(d) it depends on the transaction 14 31.8 6 42.9
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2.  Why might outside transactional lawyers provide greater reputational value than in-house transactional 
lawyers (check all that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=59)   (n1=14)   
(a) outside transactional lawyers are independent, whereas 
in-house transactional lawyers are employees of the 
company 13 22.0 4 28.6
(b) outside transactional lawyers are, on average, more 
qualified than in-house transactional lawyers for the work 
they do 9 15.3 8 57.1
(c) outside transactional lawyers may be no more 
qualified, but reputational perceptions change slowly 36 61.0 8 57.1
(d) other 12 20.3 4 28.6
     
     
3.  Why might outside transactional lawyers, on average, be more qualified than in-house transactional 
lawyers for transactional work (check all that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=59)   (n1=14)   
(a) outside transactional lawyers are, on average, smarter 
than in-house transactional lawyers 1 1.7 1 7.1
(b) outside transactional lawyers are, on average, better 
legally educated than in-house transactional lawyers 1 1.7 1 7.1
(c) outside transactional lawyers see the type of 
transaction more often 45 76.3 13 92.9
(d) other 12 20.3 1 7.1
     
     
4.  To what extent are you able to compete with outside law firms in hiring the best lawyers for your in-
house transactional staff?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=59)   (n1=14)   
(a) to a great extent 9 15.3 N/A N/A 
(b) to a significant extent 12 20.3 N/A N/A 
(c) to some extent 27 45.8 N/A N/A 
(d) to a small extent or not at all 6 10.2 N/A N/A 
     
     
5.  If you answered (a), (b), or (c) to the foregoing question, what may explain your ability to compete?: 
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  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=59)   (n1=14)   
(a) higher compensation paid to lawyers on your in-house 
transactional staff 0 0.0 N/A N/A 
(b) lower stress/better lifestyle of lawyers on your in-
house transactional staff 32 54.2 N/A N/A 
(c) more flexible hours available to lawyers on your in-
house transactional staff 8 13.6 N/A N/A 
(d) other 11 18.6 N/A N/A 
     
     
[Outside Counsel Only] 4.  To what extent is your law firm able to compete with in-house legal 
departments in hiring the best lawyers for transactional work?:  
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
  Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a)__ to a great extent N/A N/A 8 57.1
(b)__ to a significant extent N/A N/A 5 35.7
(c)__ to some extent N/A N/A 0 0.0
(d)__ to a small extent or not at all N/A N/A 1 7.1
     
[Outside Counsel Only] 5.  If you answered (a), (b), or (c) to the foregoing question, what may explain 
your ability to compete? (check all that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
  Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a)__ your law firm pays higher compensation N/A N/A 10 71.4
(b)__ your law firm engages in more interesting and 
diverse transactions  N/A N/A 12 85.7
(c)__ there is greater prestige associated with your law 
firm N/A N/A 7 50.0
(d)__ other (please explain):  N/A N/A 3 21.4
     
6.  To what extent do you hire outside transactional lawyers in business transactions simply because other 
parties request legal opinions of your independent outside lawyers?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) to a great extent 1 2.3 N/A N/A 
(b) to a significant extent 8 18.2 N/A N/A 
(c) to some extent 10 22.7 N/A N/A 
(d) to a small extent or not at all 25 56.8 N/A N/A 
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7.  When a third party requests a legal opinion in a business transaction (on matters other than corporate 
housekeeping), how often will that party accept an opinion issued by your in-house transactional lawyers?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) almost always 6 13.6 N/A N/A 
(b) often 9 20.5 N/A N/A 
(c) occasionally 22 50.0 N/A N/A 
(d) rarely 4 9.1 N/A N/A 
     
     
G.      
     
1.  To what extent does the attorney-client privilege help facilitate your company’s business transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) to a great extent 10 22.7 3 21.4
(b) to a significant extent 6 13.6 3 21.4
(c) to some extent 15 34.1 5 35.7
(d) to a small extent or not at all 11 25.0 3 21.4
e) the attorney-client privilege works against facilitating 
transactions 2 4.5 0 0.0
     
     
2.  How does the in-house attorney-client privilege compare to the attorney-client privilege created by 
using outside transactional lawyers?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) in-house privilege is much weaker 7 15.9 1 7.1
(b) in-house privilege is somewhat weaker 26 59.1 4 28.6
(c) in-house privilege is about the same 10 22.7 7 50.0
(d) in-house privilege is somewhat stronger 0 0.0 0 0.0
e) in-house privilege is much stronger 1 2.3 0 0.0
     
     
3.  All other things being equal, would you consider hiring an outside law firm to handle a “sensitive” 
transaction simply to take advantage of the stronger (or perceived stronger) attorney-client privilege?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
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Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) yes 22 50.0 N/A N/A 
(b) no 9 20.5 N/A N/A 
(c) possibly 13 29.5 N/A N/A 
     
     
H.      
     
1.  Approximately what percentage of your company’s business transactions are currently lawyered 
primarily in-house?: ___%. 
     
 General Counsel   
 Average     
 (n=59)     
 68     
     
[Outside Counsel Only] 1.  Is there increasing in-house lawyer competition for outside lawyer 
transactional legal work? (check all that apply): 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
  Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a)__ yes N/A N/A 7 50.0
(b)__ no N/A N/A 2 14.3
(c)__ although in-house lawyers may be doing more 
transactional legal work, they are not doing the 
sophisticated or complex work done by outside lawyers N/A N/A 5 35.7
(d)__ although in-house lawyers may be doing more 
transactional legal work, overall transactional legal work 
is expanding sufficiently to mitigate outside lawyer 
concerns about competition  N/A N/A 3 21.4
     
     
     
2.  If the current percentage is less than the percentage of your company’s business transactions that you 
would like to see lawyered in-house, what accounts for the discrepancy (check all that apply): 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) difficulty in matching number of in-house transactional 
lawyers on staff with fluctuating volume of transactional 
work 14 31.8 N/A N/A 
(b) outside law firms have the expertise necessary for 
complex or unusual transactions 13 29.5 N/A N/A 
(c) third parties sometimes insist that your company uses 
an outside law firm 1 2.3 N/A N/A 
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(d) other 10 22.7 N/A N/A 
     
     
3.  How does the percentage of business transactions currently lawyered in-house compare with the 
percentage lawyered in-house ten years ago?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) currently much lower 0 0.0 N/A N/A 
(b) currently slightly lower 4 9.1 N/A N/A 
(c) currently about the same 4 9.1 N/A N/A 
(d) currently slightly higher 13 29.5 N/A N/A 
(e) currently much higher 19 43.2 N/A N/A 
     
     
4.  Please comment on the following proposition: “There has been no transformation in the inherent value 
provided by in-house and outside transactional lawyers. Rather, the shift from outside to in-house 
transactional lawyers has been occurring because burgeoning legal costs have made companies more 
sensitive to legal bills. At the same time, transactional legal work has matured and become more 
straightforward and companies have grown and engage in repetitive transactions, making it more feasible 
to bring legal work in-house and save costs.” 
     
5.  Are there any other factors, not mentioned in this questionnaire, that might explain the shift from 
outside to in-house transactional lawyering or a transformation in the value or relative value provided by 
in-house and outside transactional lawyers?: 
     
6.  To the best of your knowledge, would you answer any of the questions in Parts A-G of this 
questionnaire differently if you were responding 10 years ago? If so, please explain (ignore questions that 
ask for specific numbers): 
     
7.  Please try to answer the preceding question as if the reference to “10 years ago” read “20 years ago”: 
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2.  Of the considerations you checked, how would you rank them in degree of importance (“A” being most 
important, “B” being next most important, and so on)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
*Number that ranked A  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) size of the transaction 1 2.3 2 14.3
(b) complexity or novelty of the transaction 26 59.1 9 64.3
(c) riskiness of the transaction 5 11.4 1 7.1
(d) perceived importance to senior management of 
successfully closing the transaction 2 4.5 1 7.1
(e) anticipated legal expenses of the lawyers used 3 6.8 0 0.0
(f) need for quality work 2 4.5 0 0.0
(g) timely availability and responsiveness 3 6.8 1 7.1
(h) other 5 11.4 0 0.0
     
     
3.  Which of the following factors help to explain why in-house lawyers may be a lower-cost provider, 
compared to an outside law firm, of transactional legal services (check all that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) using in-house lawyers reduces incidental costs 28 63.6 3 21.4
(b) using in-house lawyers eliminates the need to educate 
an outside law firm about your company’s organization 
and operations 38 86.4 7 50.0
(c) -house lawyers tend to close transactions more quickly 
than law firms 19 43.2 0 0.0
(d) effective “hourly rate” of in-house lawyers is lower 35 79.5 12 85.7
(e) in-house lawyer costs are less visible to senior 
management 16 36.4 8 57.1
(f) other 5 11.4 3 21.4
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4.  Which of the following factors help to explain why an outside law firm may be a lower-cost provider, 
compared to in-house lawyers, of transactional legal services (check all that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) law firms tend to have more extensive knowledge of 
transactional law 21 47.7 9 64.3
(b) when they must educate themselves on a point of 
transactional law, law firms can apportion the cost of this 
educational process among numerous clients 11 25.0 4 28.6
(c) hiring a law firm can make it easier to match the 
number of in-house transactional lawyers on staff with the 
fluctuating volume of transactional work 17 38.6 13 92.9
(d) law firms tend to close transactions more quickly than 
in-house lawyers 1 2.3 4 28.6
(e) where the other side pays your legal fees, it is more 
common to pay outside lawyer fees than in-house lawyer 
imputed fees 11 25.0 6 42.9
(f) other 10 22.7 2 14.3
     
     
5.  How would you compare the trend in in-house transactional lawyer salaries with the trend in outside 
law firm billing rates for transactional work (check all that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) both are increasing at about the same rate 4 9.1 1 7.1
(b) in-house transactional lawyer salaries are increasing 
more rapidly than law firm billing rates 0 0.0 0 0.0
(c) law firm billing rates are increasing more rapidly than 
in-house transactional lawyer salaries 40 90.9 4 28.6
(d) other 1 2.3 9 64.3
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6.  Which of the following factors help to explain why in-house lawyers may provide greater benefits, 
compared to an outside law firm, as the primary lawyers on a business transaction (check all that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) in-house lawyers’ intimate familiarity with your 
company allows them to more quickly spot issues than 
outside lawyers 44 100.0 11 78.6
(b) in-house lawyers are usually involved at a much earlier 
stage in the transaction than outside law firms and 
therefore can take a more proactive approach 39 88.6 8 57.1
(c) in-house lawyers have a greater incentive to always 
ensure that your company is protected 11 25.0 0 0.0
(d) in-house lawyers have greater expertise in certain types 
of transactions 10 22.7 2 14.3
(e) in-house lawyers better understand the company’s 
“culture” 38 86.4 6 42.9
(f) more timely availability and responsiveness of in-house 
lawyers 24 54.5 1 7.1
(g) in-house lawyers have access to more and/or better 
resources 7 15.9 0 0.0
h) in-house lawyers perform higher quality transactional 
work 5 11.4 0 0.0
(i) other 3 6.8 1 7.1
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7.  Which of the following factors help to explain why an outside law firm may provide greater benefits, 
compared to in-house lawyers, as the primary lawyers on a business transaction (check all that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) a law firm’s more extensive knowledge of transactional 
law may allow them to spot issues that could be 
overlooked by in-house lawyers 26 59.1 13 92.9
(b) law firms have access to more and/or better resources 23 52.3 11 78.6
(c) lawyers at outside firms are more independent, and 
thus more objective, than in-house lawyers 11 25.0 2 14.3
(d) lawyers at outside firms have greater expertise in 
certain types of transactions 23 52.3 7 50.0
(e) law firms are specifically set up to get transactions 
done by having sufficient support staff (e.g., proofreading, 
photocopying, word processing, paralegals) to handle a 
large volume of transactions 27 61.4 12 85.7
(f) more timely availability and responsiveness of lawyers 
at outside firms 4 9.1 9 64.3
(g) lawyers at outside firms perform higher quality 
transactional work 2 4.5 6 42.9
(h) other 0 0.0 0 0.0
     
     
8.  In-house transactional lawyer costs are (check all that apply): 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) less transparent to senior management than outside 
lawyer costs 15 34.1 N/A N/A 
(b) as transparent to senior management as outside lawyer 
costs 6 13.6 N/A N/A 
(c) absorbed in, or obscured by, other company costs 17 38.6 N/A N/A 
(d) appropriately transparent to senior management 20 45.5 N/A N/A 
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B.      
     
1.  In deciding whether to use in-house lawyers or an outside law firm as the primary lawyers on a 
business transaction, to what extent do you take into account the lawyer’s ability to observe and report 
potential misbehavior by company managers working on the transaction?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) to a great extent 2 4.5 N/A N/A 
(b) to a significant extent 2 4.5 N/A N/A 
(c) to some extent 17 38.6 N/A N/A 
(d) to a small extent or not at all 23 52.3 N/A N/A 
     
     
2.  Who can better observe misbehavior by company managers working on business transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) in-house lawyers 41 93.2 9 64.3
(b) lawyers at an outside law firm (hereinafter, “outside 
lawyers”) 1 2.3 4 28.6
     
     
3.  Please explain your answer to the foregoing question: 
     
     
4.  Who is more likely to report misbehavior by company managers working on business transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) in-house lawyers 39 88.6 1 7.1
(b) outside lawyers 1 2.3 9 64.3
     
     
5.  Please explain your answer to the foregoing question:     
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6.  When using outside lawyers as the primary lawyers on a business transaction, to what extent do you 
also use in-house lawyers to monitor their work?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) to a great extent 21 47.7 4 28.6
(b) to a significant extent 18 40.9 8 57.1
(c) to some extent 4 9.1 3 21.4
(d) to a small extent or not at all 1 2.3 0 0.0
     
     
7.  In the context of the prior question, which of the following do your in-house lawyers monitor (check all 
that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) outside lawyer billing 40 90.9 13 92.9
(b) progression of the transaction 43 97.7 13 92.9
(c) level of protection provided to the company 34 77.3 6 42.9
(d) other 14 31.8 2 14.3
     
     
8.  To what extent does reducing the number of outside law firms used for transactional work 
(“convergence”) reduce the need for in-house lawyer monitoring of law firms used in business 
transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) to a great extent 2 4.5 N/A N/A 
(b) to a significant extent 5 11.4 N/A N/A 
(c) to some extent 19 43.2 N/A N/A 
(d) to a small extent or not at all 17 38.6 N/A N/A 
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C.      
     
1.  Approximately how many (significant) business transactions on average does your company engage in 
annually?: 
     
 General Counsel   
 Average     
 (n=44)     
 165     
     
2.  Approximately what percentage of your company’s in-house lawyers spend all or substantially all of 
their time on transactional legal work: ____%. 
     
 General Counsel   
 Average     
 (n=44)     
 39     
     
3.  Who handles repetitive transactions more efficiently, taking into account quality and cost?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) in-house lawyers 9 20.5 5 35.7
(b) outside lawyers 6 13.6 1 7.1
(c) it depends on the nature of the transaction 29 65.9 8 57.1
     
     
4.  Please explain your answer to the foregoing question: 
     
5.  Who handles non-repetitive transactions more efficiently, taking into account quality and cost?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) in-house lawyers 9 20.5 1 7.1
(b) outside lawyers 6 13.6 8 57.1
(c) it depends on the nature of the transaction 29 65.9 4 28.6
     
     
6.  Please explain your answer to the foregoing question: 
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7.  Where a third party is expected to pay your company’s transactional legal fees, how likely is it that 
they would agree to pay your company’s in-house lawyer imputed fees (assuming in-house lawyers act as 
the primary transactional lawyers)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) very likely 1 2.3 N/A N/A 
(b) somewhat likely 8 18.2 N/A N/A 
(c) unlikely 35 79.5 N/A N/A 
     
     
D.      
     
1.  How much government regulation is your company subject to (compared to companies generally)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) much more than average 16 36.4 N/A N/A 
(b) somewhat more than average 6 13.6 N/A N/A 
(c) about average 10 22.7 N/A N/A 
(d) less than average 10 22.7 N/A N/A 
(e) little or none 2 4.5 N/A N/A 
     
[Outside Counsel Only] 1. The fees charged by outside transactional lawyers are as high as they are 
because (check all that apply):  
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
  Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a)__ law firms have to compete with investment banks 
for top transactional people N/A N/A 1 7.1
(b)__ law firms pay a premium to hire and train the best 
entry-level associates N/A N/A 6 42.9
(c)__ law firms try to maintain a degree of income parity 
among lawyers at the same level working in different 
areas of concentration even though some transactional 
areas are less inherently lucrative than other areas N/A N/A 2 14.3
(d)__ other (please specify): N/A N/A 8 57.1
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2.  To what extent, if any, are your in-house transactional lawyers more familiar than your outside lawyers 
with the regulatory issues that impact your company’s transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) much more familiar 11 25.0 N/A N/A 
(b) somewhat more familiar 15 34.1 N/A N/A 
(c) equally familiar 9 20.5 N/A N/A 
(d) less familiar 6 13.6 N/A N/A 
(e) it depends 3 6.8 N/A N/A 
     
     
3.  If you answered (a) or (b) to the foregoing question, to what extent does that greater familiarity enable 
the in-house transactional lawyers to handle transactions more efficiently than outside lawyers, taking into 
account quality and cost?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) much more efficiently 6 13.6 N/A N/A 
(b) somewhat more efficiently 14 31.8 N/A N/A 
(c) not necessarily more efficiently 5 11.4 N/A N/A 
(d) it depends 2 4.5 N/A N/A 
     
     
4. How complex is your company’s organization and operational structure (compared to that of companies 
generally)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) much more complex than average 5 11.4 N/A N/A 
(b) somewhat more complex than average 9 20.5 N/A N/A 
(c) about average complexity 16 36.4 N/A N/A 
(d) less complex than average 14 31.8 N/A N/A 
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5.  To what extent, if any, are your in-house transactional lawyers more familiar than your outside lawyers 
with issues of your company’s organization and operational structure that impact your company’s 
transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) much more familiar 24 54.5 N/A N/A 
(b) somewhat more familiar 11 25.0 N/A N/A 
(c) equally familiar 4 9.1 N/A N/A 
(d) less familiar 4 9.1 N/A N/A 
(e) it depends 1 2.3 N/A N/A 
     
     
6.  If you answered (a) or (b) to the foregoing question, to what extent does that greater familiarity enable 
the in-house transactional lawyers to handle transactions more efficiently than outside lawyers, taking into 
account quality and cost?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) much more efficiently 14 31.8 N/A N/A 
(b) somewhat more efficiently 18 40.9 N/A N/A 
(c) not necessarily more efficiently 3 6.8 N/A N/A 
(d) it depends 0 0.0 N/A N/A 
     
     
7.  Approximately how many outside law firms, overall, does your company use for transactional work?: 
     
 General Counsel  
Average     
 (n=44)     
 5     
     
8.  To what extent could your company, by reducing the number of outside law firms used for 
transactional work, achieve greater parity between in-house and outside lawyer familiarity with regulatory, 
organizational, and operational issues that impact the company’s transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) to a great extent 1 2.3 N/A N/A 
(b) to some extent 41 93.2 N/A N/A 
(c) to a small extent or not at all 0 0.0 N/A N/A 
     
 In-House Lawyering.doc 
93
     
9.  Has your company already reduced the number of outside law firms used for transactional work to try 
to achieve that parity?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) yes 23 52.3 N/A N/A 
(b) no 21 47.7 N/A N/A 
     
     
E.      
     
1.  Who are more responsive to your company’s timing requirements in business transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) in-house transactional lawyers 23 52.3 0 0.0
(b) outside transactional lawyers 2 4.5 6 42.9
(c) about the same 19 43.2 3 21.4
     
     
2.  Who are better able to communicate with your company’s management in business transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) in-house transactional lawyers 30 68.2 1 7.1
(b) outside transactional lawyers 0 0.0 1 7.1
(c) about the same 12 27.3 7 50.0
(d) it depends 3 6.8 7 50.0
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3.  Check all of the following that describes your company’s in-house transactional lawyers: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) they are located in the corporate headquarters and have 
regular (formal or informal) contact with senior 
management 42 95.5 N/A N/A 
(b) they are located in the corporate headquarters but have 
little contact with senior management 2 4.5 N/A N/A 
(c) they are located in regional offices and have regular 
(formal or informal) contact with management at their 
locations 5 11.4 N/A N/A 
(d) they are located in regional offices but have little 
contact with management at their locations 0 0.0 N/A N/A 
     
     
4.  Are in-house transactional lawyers typically more involved in structuring your company’s business 
transactions than outside lawyers?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) yes 34 77.3 N/A N/A 
(b) no 2 4.5 N/A N/A 
(c) it depends 8 18.2 N/A N/A 
     
     
F.      
     
1.  To what extent does using outside transactional lawyers enhance your company’s reputation in a 
transaction (“reputational value”) more than using in-house lawyers?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) to a great extent 2 4.5 1 7.1
(b) to some extent 28 63.6 5 35.7
(c) not at all 0 0.0 2 14.3
(d) it depends on the transaction 14 31.8 6 42.9
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2.  Why might outside transactional lawyers provide greater reputational value than in-house transactional 
lawyers (check all that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) outside transactional lawyers are independent, whereas 
in-house transactional lawyers are employees of the 
company 9 20.5 4 28.6
(b) outside transactional lawyers are, on average, more 
qualified than in-house transactional lawyers for the work 
they do 4 9.1 8 57.1
(c) outside transactional lawyers may be no more 
qualified, but reputational perceptions change slowly 29 65.9 8 57.1
(d) other 9 20.5 4 28.6
     
     
3.  Why might outside transactional lawyers, on average, be more qualified than in-house transactional 
lawyers for transactional work (check all that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) outside transactional lawyers are, on average, smarter 
than in-house transactional lawyers 1 2.3 1 7.1
(b) outside transactional lawyers are, on average, better 
legally educated than in-house transactional lawyers 1 2.3 1 7.1
(c) outside transactional lawyers see the type of 
transaction more often 35 79.5 13 92.9
(d) other 8 18.2 1 7.1
     
     
4.  To what extent are you able to compete with outside law firms in hiring the best lawyers for your in-
house transactional staff?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) to a great extent 7 15.9 N/A N/A 
(b) to a significant extent 9 20.5 N/A N/A 
(c) to some extent 20 45.5 N/A N/A 
(d) to a small extent or not at all 4 9.1 N/A N/A 
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5.  If you answered (a), (b), or (c) to the foregoing question, what may explain your ability to compete?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) higher compensation paid to lawyers on your in-house 
transactional staff 0 0.0 N/A N/A 
(b) lower stress/better lifestyle of lawyers on your in-
house transactional staff 22 50.0 N/A N/A 
(c) more flexible hours available to lawyers on your in-
house transactional staff 6 13.6 N/A N/A 
(d) other 9 20.5 N/A N/A 
     
     
[Outside Counsel Only] 4.  To what extent is your law firm able to compete with in-house legal 
departments in hiring the best lawyers for transactional work?:  
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
  Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a)__ to a great extent N/A N/A 8 57.1
(b)__ to a significant extent N/A N/A 5 35.7
(c)__ to some extent N/A N/A 0 0.0
(d)__ to a small extent or not at all N/A N/A 1 7.1
     
[Outside Counsel Only] 5.  If you answered (a), (b), or (c) to the foregoing question, what may explain 
your ability to compete? (check all that apply)?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
  Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a)__ your law firm pays higher compensation N/A N/A 10 71.4
(b)__ your law firm engages in more interesting and 
diverse transactions  N/A N/A 12 85.7
(c)__ there is greater prestige associated with your law 
firm N/A N/A 7 50.0
(d)__ other (please explain):  N/A N/A 3 21.4
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6.  To what extent do you hire outside transactional lawyers in business transactions simply because other 
parties request legal opinions of your independent outside lawyers?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) to a great extent 1 2.3 N/A N/A 
(b) to a significant extent 8 18.2 N/A N/A 
(c) to some extent 10 22.7 N/A N/A 
(d) to a small extent or not at all 25 56.8 N/A N/A 
     
     
7.  When a third party requests a legal opinion in a business transaction (on matters other than corporate 
housekeeping), how often will that party accept an opinion issued by your in-house transactional lawyers?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) almost always 6 13.6 N/A N/A 
(b) often 9 20.5 N/A N/A 
(c) occasionally 22 50.0 N/A N/A 
(d) rarely 4 9.1 N/A N/A 
     
     
G.      
     
1.  To what extent does the attorney-client privilege help facilitate your company’s business transactions?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) to a great extent 10 22.7 3 21.4
(b) to a significant extent 6 13.6 3 21.4
(c) to some extent 15 34.1 5 35.7
(d) to a small extent or not at all 11 25.0 3 21.4
e) the attorney-client privilege works against facilitating 
transactions 2 4.5 0 0.0
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2.  How does the in-house attorney-client privilege compare to the attorney-client privilege created by 
using outside transactional lawyers?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) in-house privilege is much weaker 7 15.9 1 7.1
(b) in-house privilege is somewhat weaker 26 59.1 4 28.6
(c) in-house privilege is about the same 10 22.7 7 50.0
(d) in-house privilege is somewhat stronger 0 0.0 0 0.0
e) in-house privilege is much stronger 1 2.3 0 0.0
     
     
3.  All other things being equal, would you consider hiring an outside law firm to handle a “sensitive” 
transaction simply to take advantage of the stronger (or perceived stronger) attorney-client privilege?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) yes 22 50.0 N/A N/A 
(b) no 9 20.5 N/A N/A 
(c) possibly 13 29.5 N/A N/A 
     
     
H.      
     
1.  Approximately what percentage of your company’s business transactions are currently lawyered 
primarily in-house?: ___%. 
     
 General Counsel   
 Average     
 (n=44)     
 69     
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[Outside Counsel Only] 1.  Is there increasing in-house lawyer competition for outside lawyer 
transactional legal work? (check all that apply): 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
  Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a)__ yes N/A N/A 7 50.0
(b)__ no N/A N/A 2 14.3
(c)__ although in-house lawyers may be doing more 
transactional legal work, they are not doing the 
sophisticated or complex work done by outside lawyers N/A N/A 5 35.7
(d)__ although in-house lawyers may be doing more 
transactional legal work, overall transactional legal work 
is expanding sufficiently to mitigate outside lawyer 
concerns about competition  N/A N/A 3 21.4
     
     
     
2.  If the current percentage is less than the percentage of your company’s business transactions that you 
would like to see lawyered in-house, what accounts for the discrepancy (check all that apply): 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) difficulty in matching number of in-house transactional 
lawyers on staff with fluctuating volume of transactional 
work 14 31.8 N/A N/A 
(b) outside law firms have the expertise necessary for 
complex or unusual transactions 13 29.5 N/A N/A 
(c) third parties sometimes insist that your company uses 
an outside law firm 1 2.3 N/A N/A 
(d) other 10 22.7 N/A N/A 
     
     
3.  How does the percentage of business transactions currently lawyered in-house compare with the 
percentage lawyered in-house ten years ago?: 
     
  General Counsel Outside Lawyers 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
  (n=44)   (n1=14)   
(a) currently much lower 0 0.0 N/A N/A 
(b) currently slightly lower 4 9.1 N/A N/A 
(c) currently about the same 4 9.1 N/A N/A 
(d) currently slightly higher 13 29.5 N/A N/A 
(e) currently much higher 19 43.2 N/A N/A 
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4.  Please comment on the following proposition: “There has been no transformation in the inherent value 
provided by in-house and outside transactional lawyers. Rather, the shift from outside to in-house 
transactional lawyers has been occurring because burgeoning legal costs have made companies more 
sensitive to legal bills. At the same time, transactional legal work has matured and become more 
straightforward and companies have grown and engage in repetitive transactions, making it more feasible 
to bring legal work in-house and save costs.” 
 
Responses to question H.4 above have been incorporated 
as applicable into the article’s text. 
     
5.  Are there any other factors, not mentioned in this questionnaire, that might explain the shift from 
outside to in-house transactional lawyering or a transformation in the value or relative value provided by 
in-house and outside transactional lawyers?: 
 
Responses to question H.5 above have been incorporated 
as applicable into the article’s text. 
 
     
6.  To the best of your knowledge, would you answer any of the questions in Parts A-G of this 
questionnaire differently if you were responding 10 years ago? If so, please explain (ignore questions that 
ask for specific numbers): 
 
Responses to question H.6 above have been incorporated 
as applicable into the article’s text. 
 
     
7.  Please try to answer the preceding question as if the reference to “10 years ago” read “20 years ago”: 
 
Responses to question H.7 above have been incorporated  
as applicable into the article’s text. 
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APPENDIX B: VARIATIONS IN RESPONSES BASED ON LAW DEPARTMENT SIZE 
 
Notes:  
(1) This Appendix sets forth applicable 
variations in responses to the Company’s 
General Counsel Questionnaire based on Law 
Department size. 
(2) References below to “1-2 in-house” means 
one to two attorneys in the Legal Department; 
references below to “3-9 in-house” means 
three to nine attorneys in the Legal 
Department; and references below to “10+ in-
house” means ten or more attorneys in the 
Legal Department.        
    
    
    
A.    
1.  In deciding which to use-in-house lawyers, or an outside law firm-as the primary lawyers on a business 
transaction, what considerations do you take into account (check all that apply)?:  
    
 General Counsel 
 
% of 1-2 in-
house (n1 = 21) 
% of 3-9 in-
house (n2 = 14) 
% of 10+ in-
house (n3 = 9) 
(a)__ size of the transaction 66.7 42.9 77.8 
(b)__ complexity or novelty of the transaction 90.5 92.9 100.0 
(c)__ riskiness of the transaction 61.9 64.3 77.8 
(d)__ perceived importance to senior management of 
successfully closing the transaction 38.1 50.0 44.4 
(e)__ anticipated legal expenses of the lawyers used 61.9 78.6 66.7 
(f)__ need for quality work 28.6 21.4 55.6 
(g)__ timely availability and responsiveness 61.9 71.4 100.0 
(h)__ other (please specify):  19.0 7.1 44.4 
    
4.  Which of the following factors help to explain why an outside law firm may be a lower-cost provider, 
compared to in-house lawyers, of transactional legal services (check all that apply)?:  
    
 General Counsel 
 
% of 1-2 in-
house (n1 = 28) 
% of 3-9 in-
house (n2 = 17) 
% of 10+ in-
house (n3 = 14) 
(a)__ law firms tend to have more extensive knowledge of 
transactional law 67.9 52.9 21.4 
(b)__ when they must educate themselves on a point of 
transactional law, law firms can apportion the cost of this 
educational process among numerous clients 28.6 11.8 35.7 
(c)__ hiring a law firm can make it easier to match the number 
of in-house transactional lawyers on staff with the fluctuating 
volume of transactional work 35.7 47.1 42.9 
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(d)__ law firms tend to close transactions more quickly than in-
house lawyers 3.6 5.9 7.1 
(e)__ where the other side pays your legal fees, it is more 
common to pay outside lawyer fees than in-house lawyer 
imputed fees 35.7 23.5 14.3 
(f)__ other (please specify)  14.3 17.6 35.7 
    
7.  Which of the following factors help to explain why an outside law firm may provide greater benefits, 
compared to in-house lawyers, as the primary lawyers on a business transaction (check all that apply)?:  
    
 General Counsel 
 
% of 1-2 in-
house (n1 = 28) 
% of 3-9 in-
house (n2 = 17) 
% of 10+ in-
house (n3 = 14) 
(a)__ a law firm's more extensive knowledge of transactional 
law may allow them to spot issues that could be overlooked by 
in-house lawyers 71.4 58.8 57.1 
(b)__ law firms have access to more and/or better resources (if 
you check this factor, please specify what resources):  42.9 70.6 42.9 
(c)__ lawyers at outside firms are more independent, and thus 
more objective, than in-house lawyers 28.6 23.5 14.3 
(d)__ lawyers at outside firms have greater expertise in certain 
types of transactions (specify which: ___________________) 46.4 70.6 42.9 
(e)__ law firms are specifically set up to get transactions done 
by having sufficient support staff (e.g., proofreading, 
photocopying, word processing, paralegals) to handle a large 
volume of transactions 67.9 64.7 57.1 
(f)__ more timely availability and responsiveness of lawyers at 
outside firms 7.1 11.8 21.4 
(g)__ lawyers at outside firms perform higher quality 
transactional work 3.6 5.9 7.1 
(h)__ other (please specify) 0.0 0.0 0.0 
    
B.    
    
6.  When using outside lawyers as the primary lawyers on a business transaction, to what extent do you also 
use in-house lawyers to monitor their work?:  
    
 General Counsel 
 
% of 1-2 in-
house (n1 = 28) 
% of 3-9 in-
house (n2 = 17) 
% of 10+ in-
house (n3 = 14) 
(a)__ to a great extent 42.9 47.1 64.3 
(b)__ to a significant extent 39.3 47.1 28.6 
(c)__ to some extent 14.3 5.9 7.1 
(d)__ to a small extent or not at all 3.6 0.0 0.0 
    
7.  In the context of the prior question, which of the following do your in-house lawyers monitor (check all that 
apply)?:  
    
 General Counsel 
 % of 1-2 in- % of 3-9 in- % of 10+ in-
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house (n1 = 28) house (n2 = 17) house (n3 = 14) 
(a)__ outside lawyer billing 82.1 88.2 92.9 
(b)__ progression of the transaction 92.9 100.0 100.0 
(c)__ level of protection provided to the company 67.9 88.2 100.0 
(d)__ other (please specify):  17.9 35.3 50.0 
    
D.    
    
2.  To what extent, if any, are your in-house transactional lawyers more familiar than your outside lawyers 
with the regulatory issues that impact your company's transactions?: 
    
 General Counsel 
 
% of 1-2 in-
house (n1 = 21) 
% of 3-9 in-
house (n2 = 14) 
% of 10+ in-
house (n3 = 9) 
(a)__ much more familiar 19.0 21.4 44.4 
(b)__ somewhat more familiar 23.8 50.0 33.3 
(c)__ equally familiar 33.3 7.1 11.1 
(d)__ less familiar 14.3 21.4 0.0 
(e)__ it depends (please explain):  9.5 0.0 11.1 
    
8.  To what extent could your company, by reducing the number of outside law firms used for transactional 
work, achieve greater parity between in-house and outside lawyer familiarity with regulatory, organizational, 
and operational issues that impact the company's transactions?:  
    
 General Counsel 
 
% of 1-2 in-
house (n1 = 28) 
% of 3-9 in-
house (n2 = 17) 
% of 10+ in-
house (n3 = 14) 
(a)__ to a great extent 7.1 0.0 0.0 
(b)__ to some extent 89.3 88.2 100.0 
(c)__ to a small extent or not at all  3.6 0.0 0.0 
    
9.  Has your company already reduced the number of outside law firms used for transactional work to try to 
achieve that parity?:  
    
 General Counsel 
 
% of 1-2 in-
house (n1 = 28) 
% of 3-9 in-
house (n2 = 17) 
% of 10+ in-
house (n3 = 14) 
(a)__ yes 39.3 58.8 85.7 
(b)__ no 60.7 41.2 14.3 
    
F.    
    
1.  To what extent does using outside transactional lawyers enhance your company's reputation in a transaction 
("reputational value") more than using in-house lawyers?: 
    
 General Counsel 
 
% of 1-2 in-
house (n1 = 21) 
% of 3-9 in-
house (n2 = 14) 
% of 10+ in-
house (n3 = 9) 
(a)__ to a great extent 9.5 0.0 0.0 
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(b)__ to some extent 71.4 71.4 33.3 
(c)__ not at all 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(d)__ it depends on the transaction. 19.0 28.6 66.7 
    
2.  Why might outside transactional lawyers provide greater reputational value than in-house transactional 
lawyers (check all that apply)?:  
    
 General Counsel 
 
% of 1-2 in-
house (n1 = 28) 
% of 3-9 in-
house (n2 = 17) 
% of 10+ in-
house (n3 = 14) 
(a)__ outside transactional lawyers are independent, whereas 
in-house transactional lawyers are employees of the company 28.6 11.8 21.4 
(b)__  outside transactional lawyers are, on average, more 
qualified than in-house transactional lawyers for the work they 
do 21.4 11.8 7.1 
(c)__ outside transactional lawyers may be no more qualified, 
but reputational perceptions change slowly 60.7 64.7 57.1 
(d)__ other (please specify) 14.3 29.4 21.4 
    
H.     
1.  Approximately what percentage of your company's business transactions are currently lawyered primarily 
in-house?: ___%. 
    
 General Counsel 
 
Av'g % of 1-2 in-
house (n1 = 28) 
Av'g % of 3-9 in-
house (n2 = 17) 
Av'g % of 10+ in-
house (n3 = 14) 
 66.4 70.4 69.8 
 
 
